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INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this article is to analyze the federal character of
the European Community' with particular reference to its relation to
* Professor of Law, Fordham University; B.A. 1957, Manhattan College; J.D. 1960, New
York University. Professor Goebel has recently co-authored George A. Bermann, Roger J.
Goebel, William J. Davey & Eleanor M. Fox, Cases and Materials on European Community
Law (West 1993).
1 As used in this article, the "European Community" refers to the institutional structure
and system of law created principally by the TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter EEC TREATY or TREATY
OF RoMEJ. The European states comprising the European Community are commonly referred
to as Member States. The initial Member States were Italy, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. Denmark, Ireland and the United King-
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the new democracies of central and eastern Europe. The reasons for
this analysis are twofold.
First, the European Community (EC) may serve as a possible
model for the Confederation of Independent States (CIS), which represents the majority of the former republics of the Soviet Union, or for
the future relations between the Czech Republic and Slovakia, or between Croatia, Slovenia, and perhaps other republics of the former
Yugoslavia. Recent events have made it less likely that these states
will seriously envision the adoption of a federal system even in the
looser form represented by the European Community but changes of
circumstances later in this decade may make a federal system more
suitable for them.
A stronger reason is that several of the central European states,
notably the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland, are keenly interested in becoming members of the European Community at an indefinite date toward the end of this century. Of obvious importance are
the consequences of accession to the European Community to these
states in terms of loss of sovereignty on the one hand, and participation in the Community's governing structures on the other.
Whether the European Community should be characterized as a
federal state is a sensitive political issue because the term "federal"
immediately connotes a cession of sovereignty by the states to a central governing structure. During the process of drafting the Maastricht Treaty on European Union (TEU),2 Germany and several other
states wished to use the term "federal" in describing the Union. The
United Kingdom vehemently opposed this, preventing the word "federal" from appearing in the text.
The current process of ratification of the Maastricht Treaty has
dom became Member States in 1973, Greece in 1981, and Portugal and Spain in 1986.
Technically, the correct term is "European Communities" to take into account the two related
treaties, the TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ATOMIC ENERGY COMMUNITY, Mar.
25, 1957, 297 U.N.T.S. 167 [hereinafter EURATOM TREATY] and the earlier TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COAL AND STEEL COMMUNITY, Apr. 18, 1951, 261 U.N.T.S. 140

[hereinafter ECSC TREATY]. However, since the 1970s, the Community institutions themselves have habitually used the term "European Community," and it has become popular usage. The three treaties have been significantly amended on several occasions. The currently
effective texts were published by the EC Commission in 1987 as the TREATIES ESTABLISHING
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (1987). The EEC Treaty and other documents are reprinted
in GEORGE A. BERMANN, ROGER J. GOEBEL, WILLIAM A. DAVEY & ELEANOR M. Fox,
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW: SELECTED DOCUMENTS (1993).

2 TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION, Feb. 7, 1992, O.J. (C 224) 1 [hereinafter Maastricht
Treaty or TEU]. All of the Member States have signed the Maastricht Treaty, and as of this
writing, it is in the process of ratification.
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made it quite clear that a characterization of the European Community as a federal state, carrying the implication of a cession of sovereignty, has highly unfavorable emotional overtones. Ratification may
be especially jeopardized if a referendum is involved. Consequently,
proponents of the Maastricht Treaty in the politicized ratification process avoid any use of the word "federal." Indeed, the current popular
slogan is "subsidiarity," a vague concept connoting the intent to reduce the power transfer in some fields from the Member States to the
Community.3
Nonetheless, on an analytical basis, one can certainly maintain
that the European Community does represent a type of federal union,
already integrated economically and on the road to a greater level of
political union. Although this was probably not the state of affairs at
the outset of the Community in 1958, by the 1970s, perceptive observers realized that this was the case. Thus, Eric Stein, undoubtedly the
leading American scholar specializing in Community law, very aptly
4
characterized the Community in 1979 as "incipient federalism."
When the Treaty of Rome5 was amended significantly in 1987 by
the Single European Act (SEA), 6 the federal character of the Community became more pronounced, as we shall see in Parts Two and
Three hereafter. The Preamble to the SEA refers to the intent "to
transform the whole complex of relations between their States into a
European Union, ' 7 picking up the term used by the European Council in its 1983 Solemn Declaration on European Union.' The Maas3 Added by art. 3b of the TEU. See infra note 193 and accompanying text.
4 Eric Stein, Treaty-BasedFederalism,A.D. 1979: A Gloss on Covey T. Oliver at the Hague

Academy, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 897, 901 (1979).
5 Supra note 1.
6 SINGLE EUROPEAN ACT, Feb. 17, 1986, 1987 0..

(L 169) 1 [hereinafter SEA] repre-

sents the most substantial amendments to the TREATY OF ROME to date. The revisions made

by it were incorporated into the EEC and other treaties in the consolidated text published by
the Commission. Supra note 1. The SEA has been the subject of extensive commentary.
Among the helpful articles are George A. Bermann, The Single European Act: A New Constitution for the Community?, 27 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 529 (1989); Claus-Dieter
Ehlermann, The Internal Market Following the Single European Act, 24 COMMON MKT. L.
REV. 361 (1987); Hans-Joachim Glaesner, The Single EuropeanAct: Attempt at an Appraisal,
10 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 446 (1987); Michel Waelbroeck, The Role of the Court of Justice in
the Implementation of the Single European Act, 11 MICH. J. INT'L L. 671 (1990).
7 SEA, supra note 6, at 2.
8 E. C. Bull. 1983/6, at 24. Issued by the European Council at Stuttgart on June 19, 1983.
The European Council is composed of the Heads of State and Government of the Member
States and, as such, represents the highest political policy-makers in the Community. The
European Council has met on a regular basis two or three times a year since 1972 in order to
deal with major political disputes and to shape long-term Community policy. Title I of the
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tricht Treaty's formal title, Treaty on European Union, itself indicates
that it is intended to create, at least in part, such a union. If, as is
likely but not absolutely certain, the Maastricht Treaty is ratified, the
term "European Union" will be used to describe the structural relations between the Member States.9 The European Community will
continue to be the core of such a European Union.10 Part Four of this
article will describe the manner in which features of the proposed European Union, and new aspects of the European Community, will
augment the federal characteristics of the Community.
Although most authoritative commentators 1 continue to refrain
from describing the European Community as federal, the term seems
appropriate. The leading scholar to employ it is Professor Koen
Lenaerts, now a judge of the Court of First Instance in Luxembourg,
who in his extremely perceptive article, "Constitutionalism and the
Many Faces of Federalism," states that "[f]ederalism is present whenever a divided sovereignty is guaranteed by the national or supranational constitution and umpired by the supreme court of the common
legal order."12 After a detailed analysis, Professor Lenaerts concludes
SEA formalized the European Council structure. The Solemn Declaration on European
Union is one of the most important policy declarations of the European Council, affirming a
commitment to take concrete steps toward a European Union.
9 TEU, supra note 2, arts. A-F and J-P.
10 The TEU, Article G, contains all the amendments to be made to the EEC Treaty. Article G(A) indicates that the term "European Community" is to replace "European Economic
Community." Id.
11 Many excellent texts describe and analyze the institutional and constitutional structure
of the Community. See generally, P.J.G. KAPTEYN & P. VERLOREN VAN THEMAAT, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (L. Gormley ed., 2d ed. 1989)
[hereinafter KAPTEYN & VERLOREN VAN THEMAAT]; T.C. HARTLEY, THE FOUNDATIONS OF
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW (2d ed. 1988) [hereinafter HARTLEY]; D. LASOK & J.W.
BRIDGE, LAW AND INSTITUTIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (4th ed. 1987); P.S.R.F.
MATHIJSEN, A GUIDE TO EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW (5th ed. 1990) [hereinafter MATHJSEN]; HENRY G. SCHERMERS, JUDICIAL PROTECTION IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (4th
ed. 1976) [hereinafter SCHERMERS]. For a modem casebook treatment see GEORGE A. BERMANN, ROGER J. GOEBEL, WILLIAM J. DAVEY & ELEANOR M. Fox, CASES AND MATERIALS ON EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW (1993) [hereinafter BERMANN, GOEBEL, DAVEY &
Fox].
12 Koen Lenaerts, Constitutionalismand the Many Faces of Federalism, 38 AM. J. COMP.
L. 205, 263 (1990). Professor Lenaerts contrasts federalism in the European Community with
the federal systems of a number of other states. For a broader view of constitutional structure
and the role of the Court of Justice in the Community, see KOENRAAD LENAERTS, LE JUGE
ET LA CONSTITUTION AUX

ETATS-UNIS

D'AMfRIQUE ET DANS

L'ORDRE JURIDIQUE

EUROPtEN (1988). Valuable recent constitutional studies of the Community include Ulrich

Everling, Reflections on the Structure of the European Union, 29 COMMON MKT. L.REV. 1053
(1992); Trevor C. Hartley, Federalism, Courts and Legal Systems: The Emerging Constitution
of the European Community, 34 AM. J. COMP. L. 229 (1986); Mackenzie Stuart, Problems of
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that the European Community is indeed a type of a federal system, an
"integrative federalism."
The term federal does not admit of a precise definition, due in
part to the desire of certain commentators to employ it with a specific
content: either to be able to describe a particular country or countries
as federal, or to describe a country or countries as definitely not falling within that descriptive term. For the purpose of this essay, I will
provide a personal definition. A federal system is one in which: 1) a
constitution, or other constitutive document or documents, is, or are,
generally recognized to delineate the powers of a political structure,
as opposed to those of several separate constitutive states; 2) the constitutive states transfer some of their sovereignty, either irrevocably or
in a manner difficult of revocation, to the central political structure;
and 3) the central structure exercises a substantial degree of legislative
or regulatory, executive or administrative, and judicial or quasi-judicial authority.
Those who object to the term federal in describing the European
Community may be content to accept "supranational." As will be
evident from the following discussion, all of the present Member
States accept that the Community has the supranational characteristics set out in the preceding paragraph.
This article consists of five parts. In Part I, the Court of Justice's
constitutional doctrines describing the supranational character of the
Community will be presented. Parts II and III will outline and analyze the Community's scope of action and its institutional structure,
both as originally conceived and as modified by its history, notably by
the SEA. Part IV will review and analyze the most important
changes affecting the Community's scope and structure that would
occur if, as presently expected, the Maastrict Treaty is ratified.
Part V, the longest portion of the article, concentrates on the
issues posed in the "widening" of the Community, both with regard
to the east and central European states and with respect to the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) states. Part V will describe the
present trade and aid relations between the Community and eastern
Europe, the impact of the new European Economic Area (EEA), and
then reflect on the issues involved in the admission of EFTA and east
the European Community - TransatlanticParallels,36 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 183 (1987); G.
Federico Mancini, The Making of a Constitutionfor Europe, 26 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 595
(1989); John Temple Lang, The Development of European Community ConstitutionalLaw, 25
INT'L LAWv. 455 (1991); J.H.H. Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, 100 YALE L.J. 2403

(1991).
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European states to the Community. (Readers who already well understand the present constitutional structure of the Community may
prefer to glance only briefly at Parts I to III, concentrating on the
more novel material provided in Parts IV and V.)
I.

THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AS VIEWED BY THE
COURT OF JUSTICE

Lawyers tend to have a marked deference for what courts have to
say, especially supreme courts. The Court of Justice of the European
Community has the role of interpreting and applying the EEC Treaty
and, as such, speaks with final authority on defining the nature and
scope of the Community. It is accordingly sensible to begin by observing what the Court of Justice has said in describing the constitutional character of the Community. This is all the more sensible as a
starting point because the Court's decisions have not only substantially influenced the general perception of the Community's character,
but have themselves contributed to shaping the constitutional nature
of the Community.
As early as 1963, the Court of Justice held in the landmark Van
Gend en Loos 13 case that the Community was not a mere organization
of states created by an ordinary treaty subject to public international
law. 4 Rather, the Court conceived the Community as representing a
"new legal order" transcending public international law principles, a
"legal order" which clearly implied a sovereign or quasi-sovereign
central structure. The Court notably gave the following description:
"the Community constitutes a new legal order of international law for
the benefit of which the states have limited their sovereign rights, albeit within limited fields...
Although the term "new legal order" implies the existence of a
federal system, the Court refrained from using the word federal, no
doubt because of the emotional overtones of the word. Indeed, the
13 Case 26/62, N.V. Algemene Transport--en Expeditie Onderneming Van Gend en Loos
v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen, 1963 E.C.R. 1 [hereinafter, Van Gend en Loos].
This and other principal cases discussed in this section are excerpted and analyzed in BElRMANN, GOEBEL, DAVEY & Fox, supra note 11, chs. 4-6.
14 The Court likewise rejected the contention, advanced by Member States, that the EEC
Treaty should be interpreted in the light of public international principles, and held that it
constituted a "new legal order," binding the Member States to its own internal rules. Cases 90
and 91/63, Commission v. Luxembourg and Belgium, 1964 E.C.R. 625 (milk products); Case
38/69, Commission v. Italy, 1970 E.C.R. 47 (lead and zinc).
15 Van Gend en Loos, supra note 13, at 12.
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Treaty articles on free movement of goods,2 ° free movement of workers,21 the right of establishment for business or professional purpose,22
and the right to provide commercial, financial, professional, or other
services.

23

Ranking in importance with the direct effect doctrine is that of
the primacy of Community law over national law. The EEC Treaty
does not contain a supremacy clause: no clear textual statement exists,
as it does in the Constitution of the United States, which makes the
Constitution and federal law supreme over state law. As a result,
early in Community history the Court of Justice had to decide
whether the EEC Treaty should prevail over contrary, subsequent national law.
In 1964, in the landmark case, Costa v. ENEL,24 the Court of
Justice enunciated the doctrine of Treaty primacy. The Court's language is so striking that it merits a lengthy quotation:
By creating a Community of unlimited duration, having its own
institutions, its own personality, its own legal capacity and capacity of representation on the international plane and, more particularly, real powers stemming from a limitation of sovereignty or a
transfer of powers from the States to the Community, the Member
States have limited their sovereign rights, albeit within limited
fields, and have thus created a body of law which binds both their
nationals and themselves.
The transfer by the States from their domestic legal system to the
Community legal system of the rights and obligations arising under
the Treaty carries with it a permanent limitation of their sovereign
rights, against which a subsequent unilateral act incompatible with
the concept of the Community cannot prevail.25
In Costa v. ENEL, the Court concluded that Italian courts must
review an Italian law nationalizing certain electrical utilities to determine whether the law fully complied with obligations created by certain specific EEC Treaty provisions. The Court's elaboration of the
20 Case 74/76, lanelli & Volpi S.p.A. v. Meroni, 1977 E.C.R. 557 (involving article 30);
Case 83/78, Pigs Mktg. Bd. v. Redmond, 1978 E.C.R. 2347 (involving article 34).
21 Case 167/73, Commission v. France, 1974 E.C.R. 359 (an article 48 case involving
French merchant seamen); Case 41/74, Van Duyn v. Home Office, 1974 E.C.R. 1337 (involving article 48(3)).
22 Case 2/74, Reyners v. Belgium, 1974 E.C.R. 631 (involving article 52).
23 Case 33/74, Van Binsbergen v. Bestuur van de Bedrijfsvereniging, 1974 E.C.R. 1299
(involving article 59).
24 Case 6/64, Costa v. Ente Nazionale per l'Energia Elettrica (ENEL), 1964 E.C.R. 585.
25 Id. at 593-94.
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Court has never used the word "federal," although the phrase the
"new legal order" has become its classic depiction of the Community.
The Court's perception of the Community as such a "new legal
order" enabled it to develop a highly important principle of Commu-

nity law in Van Gend en Loos, called the "direct effect" doctrine. The
ultimate issue in the case was whether a private party could enforce
16
against a Member State obligations imposed by the EEC Treaty.
The EEC Commission has the power to sue Member States in the
Court of Justice for violations of Treaty obligations, making use of
Article 169,17 but the EEC Treaty is silent as to the rights of private
parties in this regard.
Nonetheless, the Court held that the language of certain EEC
Treaty articles is so precise, absolute, and unconditional that individuals may claim rights based upon these articles as "rights which be'
come part of their legal heritage."18
Consequently, individuals and
enterprises may assert such Treaty-based rights against Member
States in the national court systems. Such Treaty articles are said to
have "direct effect" within the national legal systems.' 9
In later cases, the Court of Justice has continued to hold that a
large number of EEC Treaty articles have direct effect so as to create
rights for individuals, natural persons or legal entities, which are enforceable by national courts against Member States. Thus, individuals can claim concrete and important applications of rights under the
16 The Netherlands government had reorganized its categories of tariffs, increasing duties
on certain items, presumably in violation of Article 12 of the EEC Treaty, which forbids any
raising of duties above 1958 levels. A freight transporter required to pay the higher duties had
sued for a refund in a Dutch tariff tribunal. Id.
17 Article 169 permits the Commission to sue Member States as a recourse against their
violations of the Treaty or any obligations arising under it. EEC TREATY, supra note 1, art.
169. The Court adjudicates the matter and Member States must respect the Court judgment.
Id. art. 171. Article 169 proceedings are one of the most powerful weapons to ensure Member
State compliance with the Treaty. The Commission frequently brings Article 169 proceedings
and is successful in most cases. Alan Dashwood & Robin White, Enforcement Actions under
Articles 169 and 170 EEC, 14 EUR. L. REv. 388 (1989) [hereinafter Dashwood & White,
Enforcement Actions]. In Van Gend en Loos, the Netherlands argued that Article 169 represented the sole remedy for Member State violations and implicitly ruled out private party
actions as a remedy. Van Gend en Loos, supra note 13, at 6.
18 Van Gend en Loos, supra note 13, at 12.
19 See generally Gerhard Bebr, Directly Applicable Provisionsof Community Law: The Development of a Community Concept, 19 INT'L & COMp. L.Q. 257 (1970); Pierre Pescatore, The
Doctrine of "DirectEffect" An Infant Disease of Community Law, 8 EUR. L. REv. 155 (1983).
See also the discussions of the direct effect doctrine in each of the texts cited supra note 11.
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primacy doctrine was all the more striking in that the Italian Constitutional Court had reached the opposite conclusion in an earlier related proceeding, namely, that the Italian nationalization law should
prevail over the EEC Treaty.2"
In the years since Costa v. ENEL, the Court of Justice has reaffirmed and further developed its primacy doctrine. Perhaps the most
important case was Internationale Handelsgesellschaft (IHG),27 in-

volving the interplay between a Community agricultural regulation
and German constitutional provisions protecting basic rights. The
Court forcefully held that Community rules, based on the EEC
Treaty, had primacy even over a national constitution and constitutionally based rights. "[T]he validity of a Community measure or its
effect within a Member State cannot be affected by allegations that it
runs counter to either fundamental rights as formulated by the constitution of that State or the principles of a national constitutional
structure."28
Such a primacy doctrine obviously creates the risk that basic
rights might not be respected. In order to avert this result, the Court
of Justice read a doctrine of respect for basic rights into the EEC
Treaty, which has no express catalog of basic rights, and further declared that the Court itself would be the guarantor of basic rights.
The Court derived this doctrine from its basic function under the
Treaty to ensure respect for the law.
[R]espect for fundamental rights forms an integral part of the general principles of law protected by the Court of Justice. The protection of such rights, whilst inspired by the constitutional
traditions common to the Member States, must be ensured within
the framework of the structure and objectives of the Community.29
In a number of subsequent decisions, the Court has developed its
conception of the nature and extent of the implied basic rights that
are to be applied when interpreting the Treaty or Community rules.
26 The Italian Constitutional Court ruling is discussed in the opinion by Advocate General
Lagrange. Id. at 605-06. (Advocates General are a special type of judges who form part of the
Court of Justice. They provide an initial advisory opinion before the Court of Justice decides a
case and renders its judgment. Although advisory, the Advocate Generals' opinions often
influence the judgment and later case law.) Subsequently, the Italian Constitutional Court
generally accepted the position of the Court of Justice. Case 183, Frontini v. Ministero delle
Finanze, 1974 II Foro It. 314, 2 C.M.L.R. 372 (1973).
27 Case 11/70, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v. Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle fur
Getreide und Futtermittel, 1970 E.C.R. 1125.
28 Id. at 1134.
29 Id,
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Although the Court has usually been concerned with the protection of
economic rights,30 as in the IHG case, it has also had occasion to deal
with rights of the person, such as the right of privacy or freedom of
speech.31 Increasingly, it has recognized procedural rights, including
the right to a fair hearing, right of appeal, right of confidential communications with attorneys, and the privilege against selfincrimination. 2
Obviously, national courts and legal systems have difficulty in
accepting the primacy doctrine, especially in the absence of an express
supremacy clause in the Treaty. It has particularly been difficult for
national courts to accept the primacy of Community law over the national constitutional protection of rights. Gradually, however, national courts have come to accept the Court's primacy doctrine,
although in some instances they have expressed concerns as to
whether the Court of Justice will in all cases sufficiently protect basic
rights. 3
The United Kingdom has posed a unique problem, because of its
lack of a written constitution. Two important elements of its unwritten constitution are the principles that one Parliament cannot bind a
later Parliament, and that a court cannot restrain the effectiveness of
an act of Parliament. The 1989 Factortame case involved the inter34
play between these principles and the doctrine of Treaty primacy.
In 1988, Parliament amended the Merchant Shipping Act to protect UK fishing interests. The Act contained provisions that, on their
30 Case 44/79, Hauer v. Land Rheinland-Pfalz, 1979 E.C.R. 3727 (right of property use
and right of professional economic operations); Case 4/73, Nold v. Commission, 1974 E.C.R.
491 (right of property use).
31 Case 29/69, Stauder v. City of Ulm, 1969 E.C.R. 419 (right of privacy); Case C-100/88,
Oyowe and Traore v. Commission, 1989 E.C.R. 4285 (freedom of expression); Case 130/75,
Prais v. Council, 1976 E.C.R. 1589 (right of non-discrimination based on religion).
32 Case 36/75, Rutili v. Minister for the Interior, 1975 E.C.R. 1219 (right to a hearing and
appeal for migrant workers); Case 178/84, Commission v. Germany, 1987 E.C.R. 1227 (right
of hearing and appeal for importers in free movement of goods cases, in this case, German
beer); Case 155/79, AM&S Europe Ltd. v. Commission, 1982 E.C.R. 1575 (privilege of confidential communications with attorneys); Case 374/87, Orkem v. Commission, 1989 E.C.R.
3283 (privilege against self-incrimination).
33 Minister for Economic Affairs v. S.A. Fromagerie Franco-Suisse "Le Ski," [1972]
C.M.L.R. 330, at 352 (Belgian Supreme Court); Administration des Douanes v. Societe Cafes
Jacques Vabre, [1975] 2 C.M.L.R. 336 (French Supreme Court); In re Application ofWiinsche
Handelsgesellschaft, [1986] 3 C.M.L.R. 225 (German Constitutional Court); Case 170/84,
S.p.a Granital v. Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato, 1984 Il Foro It. 2062, 21 CoMMON MKT L. REv. 756 (1984) (Italian Constitutional Court).
34 Case C-213/89, The Queen v. Secretary of State for Transp., ex parte: Factortame Ltd.
and Others, 1990 E.C.R. 1-2433.
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face, appeared to violate EEC Treaty rights of commercial establishment. When private parties representing Spanish fishing interests
sued in a UK court to restrain the operation of the 1988 Act, the issue
was whether a British court could defy the unwritten constitutional
tradition and restrain an act of Parliament. The Court of Justice held
that the British court, like any other national court, had an obligation
to enforce Community law against any contrary national provision,
and must restrain the operation of the national law." When the
House of Lords acquiesced to the Court's conclusion, the doctrine of
primacy of Community law received forceful application in the UK.3 6
The application of the doctrine of Treaty primacy is not limited
to occasional or rare cases. This is because the doctrine implies a
corollary, well-known in American constitutional terms as the preemption of state law by federal law. Substantial use has been made of
the doctrine that the EEC Treaty, or secondary legislation, preempts
a field of national legislative or regulatory action, or requires national
rules to be applied in consonance with Community rules.37
The Court's initial statement of the preemption doctrine came in
38 It held that Gera 1969 case, Walt Wilhelm v. Bundeskartellamt.
many's enforcement of its competition rules must be compatible with
"the uniform application throughout the Common Market of the
Community rules" on competition.39 The preemption doctrine has
also often been applied with regard to the Community's agricultural
policies. 4 ' However, the preemption doctrine's greatest importance
presently results from the broad program of Community harmonization of national rules in the fields of health and safety regulation, technical standards, environmental and consumer protection, and
35 In a subsequent proceeding, the Court of Justice held that several provisions of the 1988
amendments to the Merchant Shipping Act did indeed violate the Treaty articles on right of
commercial establishment. Case C-221/89, The Queen v. Secretary of State for Transp. ex
parte Factortame Ltd., [1991] 3 C.M.L.R. 589.
36 The opinion of Lord Bridge of Harwich was particularly clear in recognizing that the
supremacy of Community law was well established before the United Kingdom joined the
Community, and hence British courts had a duty to follow Community law principles even
when in conflict with a rule of UK law. Case C-213/89, Factortame Ltd. and Others v. Secretary of State for Transp., [1991] 1 All E.R. 70, 3 C.M.L.R. 375 (1990).
37 For an excellent review of the Community doctrine of preemption, see Eugene D. Cross,
Pre-emption of Member State Law in the European Economic Community: A Frameworkfor
Analysis, 29 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 447 (1992).
38 Case 14/68, Wilhelm v. Bundeskartellamt, 1969 E.C.R. 1.
39 Id. at 14.
40 Pigs Mktg. Bd., supra note 20.
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commercial and financial law. A leading 1979 decision41 held that
when the Community has totally harmonized a particular field of action, Member State rules must strictly follow the Community rules,
and cannot be more or less restrictive, or different in any significant
way.
The Court of Justice has recently had another occasion to articulate its view of the fundamental nature of the European Community
and the legal system which it represents. In 1991, the EC Commission requested a binding opinion of the Court to review the terms of
the proposed European Economic Area (EEA) Agreement with the
European Free Trade Association (EFTA) states.42 The Court held
that certain provisions of the draft EEA Agreement were incompatible with the EEC Treaty largely because of its view of the nature of
the Community:
[T]he EEC Treaty, albeit concluded in the form of an international
agreement, none the less constitutes the constitutional charter of a
Community based on the rule of law. As the Court of Justice has
consistently held, the Community treaties established a new legal
order for the benefit of which the States have limited their sovereign rights, in ever wider fields, and the subjects of which comprise
not only Member States but also their nationals (see, in particular,
Van Gend en Loos). The essential characteristics of the Community legal order which has thus been established are in particular
its primacy over the law of the Member States and the direct effect
of a whole series of provisions which are applicable to their nationals and to the Member States themselves.43
The EEA Agreement decision serves in some measure as a summary of the Court's views. The Court does not hesitate to characterize the EEC Treaty as a constitutional charter. It continues to regard
the Community as one in which participation in central governing
bodies is accorded to Member States in return for their cession of
sovereignty in certain stated fields of action. The Court treats the
doctrines of primacy of Community law and the direct effect of certain Treaty articles as fundamental to the Community legal system.
41 Case 148/78, Pubblico Ministero v. Ratti, 1979 E.C.R. 1629. Accord, Case 60/86, Commission v. United Kingdom, 1988 E.C.R. 3921 (dim-dip lighting); Case C-150/98, KG in
Firma Eau de Cologne & Parftimerie-Fabrik Glockengasse No. 4711 v. Provide SRL, 1989
E.C.R. 3891; Case 88/79, Minist~re Public v. Grunert, 1980 E.C.R. 1827.
42 The EEA agreement is described in Part Five C infra.
43 Opinion 1/91, European Economic Area, 1991 E.C.R. - (not yet reported) (Dec. 14,
1991), at %21, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 245, at 269, noted by Henry Schermers in 29 COMMON
MKT. L. Rnv. 991 (1992) [hereinafter Opinion 1/91].
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Although the term "federal" is not employed, the Court's vision
of the European Community accords well with the analytical model
of a federal system set forth as the author's personal definition in the
introduction. First, the EEC Treaty serves as the constitutional charter, supplemented by basic rights implied, defined, and protected by
the Court. Second, the Member States have transferred partial sovereignty to the central political institutions, the Commission, the Council, the Parliament and the Court of Justice. The Court has described
this transfer of sovereignty as "permanent." Third, the central Community political institutions exercise substantial legislative, administrative, and judicial power, whose impact is enhanced by the Court's
doctrine that the Treaty, and laws and rules pursuant to it, have primacy over, and may preempt, national law.
Whether or not one agrees that the Court's view of the Community can be labelled as "federalist," there is no question but that the
Court sees the Community as a central structure exercising substantial supranational powers in which the Member States participate, but
only at the price of a cession of part of their sovereignty.
II.

THE SCOPE OF COMMUNITY ACTION

Before describing the political structure of the European Community, it is imperative to indicate the scope of its field of action. An
otherwise impressive transfer of political governance from constitutive states to a central polity is reduced greatly in importance if the
field of action of the central polity is narrowly restricted.
The use of the word "economic" to modify "Community" in the
phrase, the European Economic Community, immediately suggests
an intention of the Community's founders to restrict it to economic
fields of action, leaving political and foreign affairs outside of the
scope of the Community. (The TEU's proposed removal of the word
"economic" as a modifier thus shows a fundamental shift in attitude.) However, the founders certainly intended the Community to
have far-reaching power within specific economic spheres. The EEC
Treaty's purpose clause, Article 2, set as its goal the creation of a
"common market," a term with broad implications. The Community
was never conceived to be limited in scope to be a free-trade zone or a
free investment and mutual developmental assistance pact, as for example, the European Free Trade Association or the proposed North
American Free Trade Association (NAFTA).
44 TEU, supra note 2, art. G(A).
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Moreover, during the course of its history the Community has
steadily expanded its fields of action. This has been achieved through
the deliberately expansive interpretation of the extent of the listed
fields of action in Article 3 of the EEC Treaty by the Commission, the
Council, and the Court of Justice, as well as by the use of the "implied
powers" or "elastic" clause, Article 235, which permits the Council to
take action, by unanimous vote, to further the common market when
no particular Treaty article specifically authorizes the action. 4s
Finally, the Single European Act's 1987 amendments added new
spheres of action and, more importantly, intensified the process of legislative activity by setting the goal of achieving a complete internal
market by December 31, 1992.46 The internal market is defined as
"an area without internal frontiers in which the free movement of
goods, persons, services and capital is ensured..."I
More specifically, Article 3 of the EEC Treaty sets forth a series
of fields of action for the Community. The first field of action is the
creation of a common customs system and a Common Commercial
Policy (CCP). 48 Other Treaty articles spell out the extent of this
CCP,4 9 and specify that the Commission represents the Community in
the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) structure.50 In
fact, over the years, the Community' has almost totally supplanted the
Member States in external trade and investment policy. This development is largely due to Court of Justice decisions that have held that
the Community has implied external relations powers corresponding
to fields of internal Community action, and which have concluded
that in certain fields of external relations, the Community has exclusive competence. 1
45 Id. art. 235. The Council can act by unanimous vote, on the basis of a Commission
proposal and after consultation of the Parliament, whenever necessary to attain an objective of
the Community or the EEC Treaty. Id. For discussion of the role and use of Article 235, see
KAPTEYN & VERLOREN vAN THEMAAT, supra note 11, at 113-17.
46 SEA, supra note 6, art. 13 amending EEC TREATY, supra note 1, art. 8a q 2.
47 SEA, supra note 6, art. 13.
48 EEC TREATY, supra note 1, art. 3(b).
49 Id. arts. 110-16.
50 Id. art. 229.
51 The leading decisions are: Case 22/70, Commission v. Council (ERTA), 1971 E.C.R.
263; Opinion 1/75, Local Costs Standard, 1975 E.C.R. 1355; Opinion 1/78, International
Agreement on Natural Rubber, 1979 E.C.R. 2871. The development of the Community's external relations power and its Common Commercial Policy is analyzed in BERMANN, GOEBEL,
DAVEY & Fox, supra note 11, chs. 26-27. See also William Rawlinson, An Overview of EEC
Trade with Non-Community Countries and the Law Governing These ExternalAgreements, 13

FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 208 (1989-90).
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Undoubtedly, the most fundamental sphere of Community action in creating the common market is the achievement of the "four
fundamental freedoms," the free movement of goods, services, persons, and capital.5 2 Since the SEA, the four fundamental freedoms
have been identified as the constituent features of the internal market.
Beginning with framework programs for legislative action in the
1960-62 period, the Community has steadily developed a system of
harmonization of Member States laws in order to break down direct
or indirect national barriers to trade. The earlier Community legislative measures only eliminated discriminatory national barriers, but
legislation since the 1970s has created Community-wide standards for
the regulation of specific commercial, financial, fiscal, professional,
53
and technical fields.

The Commission's famous program for legislative action, the
White Paper on Completing the Internal Market, 4 gave impetus to
the harmonization of laws' process. The White Paper identified sectors in which progress had been limited or virtually non-existent, such
as financial market regulation, public procurement, professional activities, internal tax harmonization and the creation of European-wideintellectual property rights, and called for specific measures to achieve
the internal market in these sectors. The Single European Act set the
date of December 31, 1992 as the terminal date for achieving the in56
ternal market55 and facilitated the legislative process to achieve it.
The goal of attaining the internal market has now largely been
completed.5 7 As of the end of 1992, the Community has adopted hun52 EEC TREATY, supra note 1, arts. 3(a) and (c).
53 For a description and analytic review of the Community's internal market legislative

program, see BERMANN, GOEBEL, DAVEY & Fox, supra note 11, chs. 9-17; MARK BREALEY
& CONOR QUIGLEY, COMPLETING THE INTERNAL MARKET OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (1989); DOMINIK LASOK, THE PROFESSIONS AND SERVICES IN THE EUROPEAN EcoNOMIC COMMUNITY (1986); NICHOLAS GREEN, TREVOR HARTLEY & JOHN USHER, THE
LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE SINGLE EUROPEAN MARKET (1991); KAPTEYN & VERLOREN

VAN THEMAAT, supra note 11; DERRICK WYATT & ALAN DASHWOOD, THE SUBSTANTIVE

LAW OF THE EEC (3d ed. 1992).
54 Completing the Internal Market: White Paper from the Commission to the European
Council, COM(85)310 final [hereinafter White Paper]. Principal credit for the authorship of
the White Paper is usually given to Commission President Jacques Delors and the Commissioner then in charge of the Internal Market Directorate General III, Lord Cockfield. The
White Paper was prepared as an agenda for Community action on the basis of a request made
by the European Council meeting in Brussels, March 29-30, 1985.
55 SEA, supra note 6, art. 8a.
56 Id. art. 100a.
57 COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, XXVTH GENERAL REPORT OF THE

ACTIVITIES OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 1991, § 2,

79 (1992) [hereinafter XXVTH
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dreds of legislative harmonization measures, many of great economic
importance. The best known are those relating to the integrated financial market, specifically, the directives intended to harmonize aspects of company, securities, accounting, banking, and insurance
law.18 Other prominent measures have harmonized features of the
value added tax system,5 9 the mutual recognition of higher education
diplomas for access to professions,' and certain types of intellectual
property rights. 1 While legislative and regulatory implementation by
the Member States has lagged behind, and probably will not be completed until the end of 1993 or even 1994, the internal market program of the Community has been a virtually unqualified success.
Moreover, the legislative pursuit of the four freedoms has been
supplemented by Court of Justice decisions that unequivocally strike
down Member State measures that discriminate against or unreasonably restrict intra-Community trade in goods or services, or limit the
free movement of workers, professionals, and students, or restrict the
right of commercial or professional establishment. 2 Similarly, the
GENERAL REPORT]. Eighty-five percent of the White Paper legislative program had been
adopted by the end of 1991. Id. Considerable efforts have been made by the Council and
Parliament to complete most of the remaining legislative agenda before the end of 1992 or
early in 1993. Id.
58 The academic literature is extensive. T.E. Cooke, The Seventh Directive - An Accountant's Perspective, 9 EUR. L. REv. 143 (1984); Michael Gruson & Wolfgang Feuring, The New
Banking Law of the European Economic Community, 25 INT'L LAW. 1 (1991); Klaus J. Hopt,
The European Insider DealingDirective, 27 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 51 (1990); Annetje Ottow, An Internal Insurance Market Before the Turn of the Century?, 29 COMMON MKT. L.
REv. 511 (1992); Jane Louise Powell, 1992: Single European Market Implicationsfor the InsuranceSector, 13 B. C. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 371 (1990); Robert Strivens, The Liberalization of Banking Services in the Community, 29 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 283 (1992); Manning
Gilbert Warren III, Global Harmonization of SecuritiesLaws: The Achievements of the European Communities, 31 HARV. INT'L L.J. 185 (1990); George S. Zavvos, Banking Integration
and 1992: Legal Issues and Policy Implications, 31 HARV. INT'L L.J. 463 (1990).
59 Council Directive 91/680, 1991 O.J. (L 376) 1; Council Directive 92/77, 1992 O.3. (L
316) 1.
60 Council Directive 89/48, 1989 0.. (L 19) 16, discussed in Roger J. Goebel, Lawyers in
the European Community Progress Towards Community-Wide Rights of Practice, 15 FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 556, 595 (1991-92).
61 The recent Community legislative initiatives are described in BERMANN, GOEBEL, DAVEY & Fox, supra note 11, ch. l1(d). The most notable achievements are Council Directive
89/104 to approximate the laws of the Member States relating to trademarks, 1988 O.J. (L 40)
1, and Council Directive 91/250 on the legal protection of computer programs, 1991 O.J. (L
122) 42.
62 For a description of the relevant case law, see the texts cited supra note 53. See also
LAURENCE W. GORMLEY, PROHIBITING RESTRICTIONS ON TRADE WITHIN THE EEC, THE

THEORY AND APPLICATIONS OF ARTICLES 30-36 OF THE EEC TREATY (1985); PETER OLIVER, FREE MOVEMENT OF GOODS IN THE EEC UNDER ARTICLES 30 TO 36 OF THE ROME

TREATY (2d ed. 1988).
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Court's preemption doctrine63 has broadened the scope and authority
of Community action at the expense of national action.
Although social action (or what we in the U.S. would call employee rights measures) is not a stated field of action in Article 3, the

EEC Treaty does contain a series of articles authorizing such action.'
Social policy became an important and integral part of Community
legislative activity with the first Social Action program of 1974.65 In
the late 1970s and 1980s, the Community adopted a number of measures intended to protect the economic interests of workers, their
health and safety, and to achieve the economic and social equality of
men and women in the workplace.6 6 This process has recently accel-

erated due to a new social action program inspired by the European
Council's adoption of the Social Charter for Workers on December 9,
1989.67 A series of new employee rights measures have been proposed

and two have already been adopted.

8

Article 3 of the EEC Treaty also called for action in the sphere of

agriculture. 69 The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) was set in
place by a major series of market organization structures70 adopted
with great effort and considerable political jockeying in the 1960s and

63 See supra text accompanying notes 37-41.
64 EEC TREATY, supra note 1, arts. 117-27.
65 Council Resolution of 21 January 1974 Concerning a Social Action Programme, 1974
O.J. (C 13) 1.
66 Some of the important measures are Council Directive 75/117 on the approximation of
the laws of the Member States relating to the application of the principle of equal pay for men
and women, 1975 O.J. (L 45) 19; Council Directive 75/129 on the approximation of the laws
of the Member States relating to collective redundancies, 1975 O.J. (L 48) 29; Council Directive 76/207 on the implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men and women as
regards access to employment, vocational training and promotion, and working conditions,
1976 O.J. (L 39) 40; Council Directive 77/187 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to the safeguarding of employees' rights in the event of transfers of undertakings, businesses or parts of businesses, 1977 O.J. (L 61) 26; and Council Directive 89/391
on the introduction of measures to encourage improvements in the safety and health of workers at work, 1989 O.J. (L 183) 1. For a review of the legislation and related case law, see
BERMANN, GOEBEL, DAVEY & Fox, supra note 11, chs. 33-34.

67 The Community Charter of Fundamental Social Rights for Workers was proposed by
the Commission in May 1989 and adopted by all the Member States except for the United
Kingdom at the European Council meeting in Strassbourg, December 9, 1989. The Commission proposal appears at E.C. Bull. 1989/5, at 114.
68 The two directives adopted thus far are Council Directive 91/533 on an employer's
obligation to inform employees of the conditions applicable to the contract or employment
relationship, 1991 O.J. (L 288) 32, and Council Directive 92/85 on the introduction of measures to encourage improvements in the safety and health at work for pregnant workers and
workers who have recently given birth or are breast-feeding, 1992 O.J. (L 348) 1.
69 EEC TREATY, supra note 1, art. 3(d).
70 The principal market organizations cover cereal, wine, and dairy products.
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1970s. 7 ' This has been supplemented since 1983 by the Common
Fisheries Policy. 72 The initial success of these programs in dramatically increasing the quantity and quality of production has in recent
years been overshadowed by the problem of dealing with massive surpluses, both because of the cost of subsidies as a huge component of
the Community budget, with consequent protests from taxpayers, and
because of trade pressure from the United States, Canada, Australia,
and other agricultural exporters, strenuously urging the Community
to dismantle its tariff, quota, and subsidy protective devices.
A final major aspect of Article 3 is its proclamation of the need
to create a Community competition policy. 73 Anti-competitive struc-

tures and market behavior can seriously restrict intra-Community
trade and artificially partition the Community. Therefore, the competition policy was seen as essential to supplement the removal of state
barriers of trade. The success of the Commission's vigorous enforcement policy, coupled with its on-going creation of regulatory guidelines for permissible restraints on competitive conduct, has been
enhanced by Court of Justice case law supportive of the Commission's
policies. 74
The SEA formally added environmental protection and pollution
control policy as a sphere of Community action.75 In fact, the first
Environmental Action Program began in 1973.76 Many important
measures were adopted in the 1970s and 1980s through use of the
"implied powers" clause, Article 235. The SEA accelerated the pro71 J. A. USHER, LEGAL ASPECTS OF AGRICULTURE IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY

(1988) (excellent survey of the complex Community rules). See also BERMANN, GOEBEL, DAVEY & Fox, supra note 11, ch. 31 (survey of market organization regulations and relevant case
law).
72

See

COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, THE COMMON FISHERIES POLICY

(European File 3/91); see also R.R. CHURCHILL, EEC FISHERIES LAW (1987).
73 EEC TREATY, supra note 1, art. 3(f).
74 The leading regulations and case law are analyzed in BERMANN, GOEBEL, DAVEY &

Fox, supra note 11, chs. 18-25. Among the many valuable commentaries are CHRISTOPHER
BELLAMY & GRAHAM D. CHILD, COMMON MARKET LAW OF COMPETITION (3d ed. 1987);
D.G. GOYDER, EEC COMPETITION LAW (1988); BARRY E. HAWK, UNITED STATES, COMMON MARKET AND INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST: A COMPARATIVE GUIDE (2d ed. 1991);
VALENTINE KORAH, AN INTRODUCTORY GUIDE TO EEC COMPETITION LAW AND PRACTICE (4th ed. 1990).
75 SEA, supra note 6, art. 25 amending EEC TREATY, supra note I, art. 130r-t.
76 Declaration of the Council of the European Communities and the Representatives of the
Governments of the Member States meeting in the Council of 22 November 1973 on the pro-

gramme of action of the European Communities on the Environment, 1973 O.J. (C 112) 1.
The Council acted at the request of the Member States' Heads of States and Government (later
called the European Council) at their meeting in Paris in October 1972.
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cess of legislative action taken through its new general harmonization
of laws provision, Article 100a," or through the new environmental
articles, 130r to t.78 In recent years, environmental action has become
one of the richest fields of Community endeavors.7 9 Indeed, the
Treaty mandates concern for the environment in the review of any
measure intended to achieve the internal market. 80
In view of the above description of the scope of the EEC Treaty,
it is apparent that the limitation of the Community to "economic"
spheres of action has not resulted in a narrow field of action, or a
minor structure. To the contrary, the Community utilized its legislative and judicial competence to develop an extraordinarily broad coverage of virtually all aspects of commercial, technical, financial,
professional, and agricultural activities. Moreover, the Community's
social and environmental programs certainly go beyond traditional
fields of economic action.
Although the Community's progress in establishing the internal
market has been prominently featured in the media in recent years,
and is accordingly well-known to the general public, the precise nature and extent of Community regulation is not well understood. Because the bulk of Community legislation, apart from the agricultural
and competition sectors, is in the form of directives,8 1 or frameworks
for national legislation and regulations, the general public is frequently not aware that the new rules that regulate its economic or
social well-being have come from the Community. Unless individuals
do business in, or travel to, other Member States, they may not be
aware that the same rules pervade the Community. The management
of multinational or larger business enterprises are fully cognizant of
77 SEA, supra note 6, art. 100a.
78 Id. art. 130r-t.
79 For a description of environmental protection policy, see STANLEY P. JOHNSON & GUY
CORCELLE, THE ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (1989); ECKARD REHBINDER & RICHARD STEWART, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION POLICY, in INTEGRATION THROUGH LAW (1985). Among the valuable articles are Auke Haagsma, The
European Community's Environmental Policy: A Case-Study in Federalism, 12 FORDHAM
INT'L L.J. 311 (1989); Dirk Vandermeersch, The Single European Act and the Environmental
Policy of the European Economic Community, 12 EUR. L. REV. 407 (1987); Rolf Wigenbaur,
The European Community's Policy on Implementation of EnvironmentalDirectives, 14 FORDHAM INT'L LJ. 455 (1990-91).

80 SEA, supra note 6, art. 100a(3).

81 Directives are the principal form of Community legislation. They are binding upon the
Member States, which must implement them in an appropriate form, usually by law, regulation, or decree. EEC TREATY, supra note 1, art. 189. The other form of Community legisla-

tion is a regulation, which is "directly applicable in each Member State." Id. In the United
States, a Congressional statute would be the equivalent of a regulation.
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the Community rule-making, but local enterprises do not necessarily
realize the extent of Community, as opposed to national, rules. There
is undoubtedly not the same understanding of the importance and
scope of Community rule-making, as there is of that of the federal
government in the United States.
However, many spheres of action of modem governments remain
outside of present Community competence. Thus, although the
SEA's Title III did authorize a system for achieving a common foreign policy, the structure is quite limited in character, is largely divorced from the basic Community institutions, and requires
unanimous action.82 The Community's inability to fully coordinate
Member State views and execute a decisive common policy has been
painfully apparent in its limited and hesitant reaction to the civil war
in the former Yugoslavia.
Similarly, the Community has had only marginal success in monetary coordination. The European Monetary System (EMS) was set
up in 1979 to coordinate national monetary policy, provide reserve
support in monetary crises, create an artificial monetary currency unit
(the ECU), and keep exchange rate fluctuations within a narrow
band.83 The EMS worked relatively well until the serious monetary
crisis of September 1992.84

That crisis demonstrated its weakness in the face of massive currency movements fueled by serious differences in uncoordinated
Member State monetary policies. The United Kingdom, Italy, and
82 SEA, supra note 6, Title III. The Member States' cooperation to achieve a common
foreign policy is outside the institutional structure of the European Community and is governed only by Title III. In fact, cooperation on foreign policy began at the direction of the
European Council in the early 1970s, so that Title III in large measure only formalizes the
prior system, called European Political Cooperation (EPC). David Freestone & Scott David-

son, Community Competence and PartIII of the Single EuropeanAct, 23 COMMON MKT. L.

REv. 793 (1986); Eric Stein, EuropeanForeign Affairs System and the Single European Act of
1986, 23 INT'L LAW. 977 (1989).
83 E.C. Bull. 1978/6, at 17. For a description, see COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, THE EMS: TEN YEARS OF PROGRESS IN EUROPEAN MONETARY COOPERATION

(1989)[hereinafter THE EMS]; BERMANN, GOEBEL, DAVEY & Fox, supra note 11, ch. 35(B).
84 The monetary crisis was triggered by the radical difference between Germany's monetary policy to combat inflation and the anti-recessionary policy pursued by France, Italy,

Spain, the United Kingdom and other states. Lionel Barber & David Marsh, Helping Others
Help Themselves: The Weekend's Currency Manoeuvers, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 15, 1992, at 18;
Alan Cowell, Kohl Urges Europe to Meet in Effort to Preserve Unity, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9,

1992, at Al; Alan Riding, Turmoil in Europe;French Approve Unity Treaty, But Slim Margin
Leaves Doubts, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 1992, at Al; Craig R. Whitney, Kohl Denies Secret Plan
to Force European Union, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 1992, at A3; Alan Cowell, Italian Stakes
Office on Austerity, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 1992, at A6.
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Greece are now outside the Exchange Rate Mechanism of the EMS,
and it is uncertain when they will choose to enter or re-enter it.
The Community's lack of power in several other fields of essential governmental action tends to shape the popular view of it as less
than a total federal system. Virtually no independent government
functions without a system of national defense and police power, yet
the Community has no jurisdiction whatsoever in those spheres. The
Community is also almost totally without power in the fields of education, except vocational training; public health, except protection of
worker health and safety, and the harmonization of health and safety
standards for products and services; and culture.
In sum, to the average person within the Community (and even
more, to the less knowledgeable observer outside of the Community),
the Community's scope of action is a bit vague and indefinite. Community action is generally perceived to be limited to the economic
sphere, with some spill-over into the social and environmental
spheres. Although the popularly perceived manifestations of the success of the internal market program has enhanced the reputation of
the Community, the Community is still not regarded by most people
as anything other than an economic federation in which the Member
States are linked for their mutual benefit. Moreover, most people do
not have a very clear idea of the degree to which Member States have
transferred legislative, administrative, or judicial powers to the Community, the subject to which we now turn.
III.

FEDERAL (OR SUPRANATIONAL) CHARACTERISTICS OF THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY

If the EEC Treaty were an ordinary international agreement or
convention to facilitate trade and investment among its signatories, as,
for example, the European Free Trade Association, then the signatory
states would continue to deal with one another as fully sovereign entities, bound only to the extent their obligations are enforceable under
customary doctrines of public international law. This was the view
taken by the Court of Justice in its opinion assessing the essential
character of the EEA Agreement between the Community and the
EFTA states,8 5 even though the EEA Agreement goes much further
in creating intergovernmental structures than do most international
86
agreements.
85 See supra notes 42-43.
86 The Court said specifically that: "[tihe EEA is to be established on the basis of an
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In contrast, the Treaty of Rome created a supranational structure with substantial governing authority. Moreover, this governing
authority was intended to be capable of binding the Member States,
and to be permanent, or at least for an indefinite term.8 7 The Court of
Justice focused on these and other features of the Community in
describing the Community as a "new legal order" in Van Gend en
Loos and other landmark decisions."'
This section analyzes the Community's institutional structure, as
established in the Treaty of Rome and modified by later amendments,
notably the Single European Act. In discussing the Community's legislative or regulatory, executive or administrative, and judicial authority, this section examines the degree to which the Community
constitutes a federal or at least a supranational system.
A. Legislative or Regulatory Powers
Unlike virtually all international agreements or conventions,
which provide for decision-making by the constituent signatories only
by consensus or unanimous accord, the EEC Treaty has from its inception provided that many types of legislation can be adopted by a
majority or, more often, a qualified majority vote of the Council of
Ministers. 9 Also, all legislation, whether in the form of regulations
or directives, is binding on Member States. The Commission may
proceed in the Court of Justice against Member States for non-compliance with Treaty obligations, or legislation adopted pursuant to the
Treaty. 90 The States must comply with the Court's decisions.9"
international treaty which, essentially, merely creates rights and obligations as between the
Contracting Parties and provides for no transfer of sovereign rights to the inter-governmental
institutions which it sets up." Opinion 1/91, supra note 43, 20, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 268.69.
87 Unlike the ECSC Treaty which has a fifty-year term, the EEC Treaty has no stated
duration. Supra note 1.
88 See supra text accompanying notes 13-26.
89 The EEC Treaty provided only occasionally for simple or ordinary majority voting by
the Council of Ministers, notably to achieve free movement of workers (Article 49) or to adopt
vocational training measures (Article 128 coupled with Article 140(1)). EEC TREATY, supra
note 1.The SEA modified Article 49 to require qualified majority voting. SEA, supra note 6.
Qualified majority voting is described in the text infra note 92.
90 See text at notes 146-47, infra, for a description of the proceedings under EEC Treaty
Art. 169. Article 169 proceedings have become very common, numbering between 50 and 100
each year. The Commission is usually victorious and the Member States ultimately comply
with the Court's judgment. For analysis of cases illustrating the procedure and common State
defenses, see BERMANN, GOEBEL, DAVEY & Fox, supra note 11, ch. 8B. See also
SCHERMERS, supra note 11, at 277-315; Dashwood & White, Enforcement Actions, supra note
17.
91 EEC TREATY, supra note 1, art. 171.
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These provisions manifestly represent a transfer of legislative
power from the Member States to the Community institutions. While
the Community can legislate only in spheres in which it has jurisdiction under the Treaty, or in which the Court has construed the Treaty
to grant implied legislative authority, this constitutes a broad and
steadily increasing field of action.
Even under the original Treaty of Rome, substantial legislation
could be adopted by a qualified majority vote of the Council of Ministers. This included legislation to achieve the free movement of services and of capital; to further the right of commercial establishment;
and to attain agricultural policy, transport policy, and competition
policy goals.9 2
The SEA greatly increased the volume of legislation that can be
adopted by a qualified majority, chiefly by dictating that legislation to
harmonize rules in order to complete the internal market, Article
100a, can be adopted by a qualified majority vote, instead of by unanimous action, as had been required to adopt harmonization directives
under the original Article 100. 93
Today, relatively few measures necessitate the Council's unanimous vote. The principal ones are in areas which remain politically
sensitive, related to Member State tax, monetary, and social policy.
Thus, the EEC Treaty continues to require unanimous Council action
for the harmonization of indirect 94 and direct taxes, 95 for monetary
conjunctoral measures, 96 for social action,9 7 and for free movement of
92 The general approach in the Treaty of Rome for many types of legislation was to require
unanimous Council action for the first stage of the transitional period phasing in the Treaty
(i.e., 1958-61) and sometimes also the second stage (1962-65), while prescribing qualified majority voting thereafter. EEC TREATY, supra note 1, arts. 43 (agriculture), 54 (right of establishment), 63 (right to provide services), 69 (free movement of capital), 75 (common transport
policy), 87 (competition policy).
In a qualified majority vote, each Member State's votes are allocated a weighted number,
somewhat in proportion to its population and economic power, varying from two votes for
Luxembourg to ten for France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom. The total weighted
vote is 76; 54 votes, or about two-thirds of the votes, is necessary to adopt a measure. EEC
TREATY, supra note 1, art. 148(2). The total number of weighted votes and the requisite
number of votes to attain the qualified majority has, of course, been modified each time new
Member States have joined the Community. This system of voting is intended to insure, on the
one hand, that not more than two large States can be outvoted, and, on the other hand, that a
measure cannot be adopted unless a majority of all States vote in favor of it.
93 This change in the voting system has enabled the adoption of proposals in fields where
action had long been blocked. White Paper, supra note 54.
94 EEC TREATY, supra note 1, art. 99.
95 Id. art. 100a(2).
96 Id. art. 103(2).
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persons who are not workers."8
For much of its history the Council functioned as though unanimous voting were required, although a qualified majority was sufficient in many spheres of action. This was due to the general
acceptance of the Luxembourg Compromise.
In 1965, President De Gaulle of France became incensed at
Commission proposals, largely identified with the first Commission
President, Walter Hallstein, to improve the Community's structure.
The principal proposals were to increase use of qualified majority voting, to provide the Community with its own source of revenues, and
to allow the Parliament to be elected directly-all of which have since
come to pass. De Gaulle removed French representatives from all
Community meetings, engendering a political crisis that lasted for
several months. In January 1966, the Member State representatives
met in Luxembourg and worked out a compromise formula. The key
paragraphs read:
1. Where, in the case of decisions which may be taken by majority vote on a proposal of the Commission, very important interests
of one or more partners are at stake, the members of the Council
will endeavor, within a reasonable time, to reach solutions which
can be adopted by all the members of the Council while respecting
their mutual interests and those of the Community, in accordance
with Article 2 of the Treaty.
2. With regard to the preceding paragraph, the French delegation
considers that when very important issues are at stake, the discus99
sion must be continued until unanimous decision is reached.
For many years, France and other Member States, notably the
United Kingdom after its accession in 1973, interpreted the Luxem97 Id. art. 100a(2). Article 100a(2) continues to require unanimous voting on measures
concerning employee rights, but the SEA makes an exception for worker health and safety
measures, where it permits qualified majority voting. SEA, supra note 6, art. 118a.
98 Id. Measures to achieve free movement of workers may be adopted by qualified majority voting under Article 49, so that the reference to measures to attain free movement of persons in Article 100a(2) must be read as covering only persons who are not workers, e.g.,
students and retired persons. Id. In fact, legislation has recently been adopted to grant rights
of free movement and residence to students, retired persons and persons who do not work or
have never worked. See Council Directive 90/364, 1990 O.J. (L 180) 26; Council Directive
90/365, 1990 O.J. (L 180) 28; Council Directive 90/366, 1990 O.J. (L 180) 30.
99 The text of the Luxembourg Compromise appears in Legislation Section, 3 COMMON
MKT. L. REV. 469 (1965-66) and is partially reproduced in BERMANN, GOEBEL, DAVEY &
Fox, supra note 11, at 54. The Luxembourg Accord represented calculated ambiguity, because the Member States other than France did not expressly agree with France, but, on the
other hand, did not oblige France to recognize that its view did not accord with express Treaty
provisions.
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bourg Compromise to mean that all large Member States had an effective veto on legislative proposals. Clearly, this made qualified
majority voting illusory, and the Treaty resembled an ordinary international convention.
However, the Single European Act has effectively swept away the
Luxembourg Compromise. While the SEA makes no reference to the
Compromise, its substantial expansion of qualified majority voting
has, in practice, resulted in an effective disavowal of the Compromise.
In its Annual Reports to Parliament since the SEA, the Commission
has observed that qualified majority voting has been adhered to faithfully in practice.1 "0 An examination of votes taken on important
measures shows that even large States allow themselves to be
outvoted.
Perhaps even more important than the Council's qualified majority voting as an indication of the federal, or supranational, nature of
the Community is the participation of a directly-elected Parliament in
the legislative process. The initial Treaty of Rome clearly intended
the Parliament (originally called the Assembly) to be a rather unimportant body. 01 Its chief role was to exercise a moderate level of influence over the Commission. The Commission must provide an
annual report to the Parliament, must reply to written or oral parliamentary questions, and may be subject to a vote of censure.102 Other100

See, e.g., COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, XXIIND GENERAL REPORT

OF THE AcrIvmES OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 1988, at
IIND GENERAL REPORT]. "The now fully accepted possibility

4 (1989) [hereinafter XXof adopting a decision by a
qualified majority forces the [Member State] delegations to display flexibility throughout the
debate, thus making decision-making easier. The dynamism generated in those areas in which
majority voting is possible... has led to decisions on major issues.. ." Id. For an interesting
analysis of the implicit repudiation, or at least limitation, of the Luxembourg Compromise, see
J.J.H. Weiler, supra note 12, at 2458-61.
101 See EEC TREATY, supra note 1, arts. 137-44. The Parliament disliked the name "Assembly" and commenced using the name "Parliament" to describe itself almost at once, with a
view to stressing its resemblance to the role of the French or UK Parliaments. The other
institutions accepted this term in the 1970s, and the name was formally changed to "European
Parliament" by the Single European Act. SEA, supra note 6, Title I, art. 3.
102 The Commission must prepare an annual "general report on the activities of the Community." EEC TREATY, supra note 1, art. 156. The report is then the subject of parliamentary debate. Id. art. 143. The Commission must reply "orally or in writing to questions put to
it by the Assembly or its members." Id. art. 140. The Parliament makes extensive use of this
question procedure both to secure information and to incite the Commission to action. In
1991 the Parliament tabled 2,905 written and 838 oral questions for answer by the Commission. XXVTH GENERAL REPORT, supra note 57, 1160. Since the early 1980s, the Council
has also voluntarily responded to questions from Parliament - in 1991, 257 written and 238
oral questions. Finally, the Parliament may vote to censure the Commission. If the vote carries by a two-thirds majority, the Commission must resign. Id. art. 144. Although this ap-
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wise, the Parliament was limited to giving advice
on certain types of
10 3
matters.
other
in
role
no
legislation, and had
Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, the Parliament lobbied intensively for greater status. The so-called "democratic deficit" constituted by Parliament's weak stature became widely recognized.
Certain Member States, notably Germany and Italy, increasingly supported Parliament's aspirations.
The Parliament's stature was dramatically raised when Parliament became elected directly by Member State nationals. In the prior
system of election, national parliaments elected the Members of Parliament. Although the Treaty of Rome anticipated that the Assembly
might be directly elected, "4 the French Government under President
De Gaulle opposed this. At their 1974 summit meeting in Paris, the
Member States' Heads of State and Government finally decided to
allow direct election. The Council adopted the necessary measure in
1976,105 and Parliament's first direct election occurred in June 1979,
with successive elections at five-year intervals. Because Parliament is
now directly elected, it can claim a popular democratic mandate that
entitles it to a greater share in Community governance.
The SEA created a new legislative procedure involving the Parliament more deeply, and applied the procedure to a substantial
number of legislative measures, including measures intended to harmonize rules to achieve the internal market under Article 100a, or to
facilitate free movement of workers under Article 49, or to facilitate
rights of establishment under Article 54. This legislative process, usually called the parliamentary cooperation procedure, permits Parliament to examine legislative proposals at two different stages in the
pears to be sweeping power, it is unlikely to be used, since Parliament is much more apt to be
critical of the Council than of the Commission.
103 The initial Treaty of Rome text provided that the Parliament had to be consulted before
the Council could adopt several types of legislation, e.g., measures to carry out the CAP, art.
43, or the common transport policy (art. 75), to achieve the right of establishment (art. 54),
and to implement competition policy (art. 87). TREATY OF ROME, supra note 1. For many

other types of legislative action, the Parliament did not have to be consulted. Furthermore, its
advice could, of course, be disregarded. The obligation to consult the Parliament was, however, an absolute condition for the validity of the legislation to be adopted by the Council.
Case 138/79, S.A. Roquette Fr~res v. Council, 1980 E.C.R. 3333. For a general description of
Parliament, its role and powers before and after the SEA, see HARTLEY, supra note 11, at 2349; KAPTEYN & VERLOREN VAN THEMAAT, supra note 11, at 131-45; MATHIJSEN, supra
note 11, at 16-34.
104 EEC TREATY, supra note 1, art. 138.
105 Council Act concerning the election of the representatives of the Assembly by direct

universal suffrage, 1976 O.J. (L 278) 5.
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10 6
process, and at each time it has the right to propose amendments.
Although Parliament's amendments are not binding, they are highly
influential, in part because in the final stage the Council can only reject a parliamentary amendment by unanimous vote. The Commission has estimated that since the Single European Act, a large number
of Parliament's proposed amendments have been accepted. 107 Thus,
Parliament has become an active and influential participant in the legislative process.
Parliament's very existence as a directly elected body is a strong
token of a federal structure in the Community, because Parliament
draws its popular mandate immediately from the people of the Community. As the Parliament gains a growing share of influence in the
legislative, budgetary,10 8 or other aspects of the political process, 10 9 its
role not only augments the democratic character of the Community,
but also enhances its federal nature.
Thus, in conclusion, substantial legislative and regulatory authority, in ever-expanding fields of action, has been transferred from
the Member States to Community institutions. The Council of Ministers, which remains the paramount body in the legislative process,
106 The complex parliamentary cooperation system outlined in Article 149(2), requiring two
distinct stages of examination ("readings") by the Council and the Parliament, and indicating
the voting requirements and time periods, is described in BERMANN, GOEBEL, DAVEY & Fox,

supra note 11, ch. 3C, as well as in each of the texts cited in note 103 supra. See also Roland
Bieber, Legislative Procedurefor the Establishmentof the Single Market, 25 COMMON MKT. L.
REV. 711 (1988); Darryl S. Lew, Note, The EEC Legislative Process: An Evolving Balance, 27
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 679 (1988).
107 Since 1987, 46 percent of the amendments proposed by Parliament in its first reading,
and 27 percent of those proposed in its second reading, have ultimately been incorporated in
the legislation. XXVTH GENERAL REPORT, supra note 57, at 1149. This suggests that
Parliament exerts a strong influence in the legislative process, but the Council's views continue
to be decisive.
108 The budgetary process is outlined in EEC TREATY, supra note 1, arts. 202-206. The
budgetary process is even more complicated than the legislative process and has, in practice,
resulted in incessant disputes between the Council and the Parliament over their respective
powers. The Council's role is by far predominant. KAPTEYN & VERLOREN VAN THEMAAT,

supra note 11, at 208-39.
109 The SEA, supra note 6, granted Parliament the right to assent (i.e., a veto right) before
any applicant state can become a new Member State, art. 237, and before the entry into effect
of any association agreement, granting special trade and investment rights, with third states.
Id. art. 238. In addition, Parliament has sought in recent years to acquire standing to challenge the conduct of the Council in proceedings before the Court of Justice. The Court has
recognized Parliament's implied power to sue the Council for the latter's failure to fulfill its
clearly prescribed Treaty obligations, Case 13/83, Parliament v. Council (involving common
transport policy), 1985 E.C.R. 1513; and for the Council's failure to respect, under some circumstances, Parliament's prerogatives the parliamentary cooperation process, Case C-70/88,
Parliament v. Council (Post-Chemobyl), 1990 E.C.R. 1-2041.
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acts on most types of measures by qualified majority vote. Because
qualified majority has increasingly meant that one, or even several,
Member State(s) have been outvoted, the legislative process represents
a system of transferred sovereignty from the Member States. Moreover, the augmented role given to Parliament through the parliamentary cooperation procedure enhances the picture of transferred
sovereignty. In its legislative role, as in its other powers, the Parliament acts through a direct popular mandate, further promoting the
reality of sovereignty transfer from Member States to the Community.
B. Executive or Administrative Authority
While the Community institutions have sweeping administrative
powers, what is usually regarded as the executive component in a governmental system exists only partially in the Community structure.
The EC Commission is the center of administrative operations."l0
The Commission, composed formally of seventeen Commissioners
chosen by the Member States for renewable four-year terms, is the
acme of the civil service bureaucracy of the Community.' 1 ' The EEC
Treaty stresses that the Commissioners are to be independent of the
States which selected them. 1 ' The independence of the Commission
has been a strong feature in Community history.
Although the President of the Commission, also designated by
the Member States,' 13 has a central role in Community affairs, and
does much more than merely chair Commission meetings, the Treaty
provides him with no specific authority."' Custom developed over
the course of Community history, together with the dynamic person110 EEC TREATY, supra note 1,arts. 155-63 (delineates the composition, role, and functioning of the Commission). For detailed descriptions, see the texts cited supra note 103.
111 EEC TREATY, supra note 1, arts. 157-58. The Commission's staff, organized in twentythree Directorates-General corresponding to various administrative units and fields of activity,
together with the Commission Secretariat, Legal Service, Information Service, Language Service, and Office of Official Publications, represents a substantial and quite efficient civil service.
Most posts are chosen by competitive examinations open to all Community nationals. The
Commission's permanent staff numbered 12,599 in 1991. XXVTH GENERAL REPORT, supra
note 57, 1170.
112 The Commissioners' "independence [must be] beyond doubt" and they "shall neither
seek nor take instructions from any Government or from any other body." EEC TREATY,
supra note 1, art. 157.

113 The President serves for two-year renewable terms. EEC TREATY, supra note 1, art.
161. The six Vice-Presidents' role is largely ceremonial. Id.
114 The Treaty does not even expressly state that the President should chair meetings of the
Commission or represent the Commission to any other body within or outside the Community
structure.
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ality and political sense of certain Commission Presidents, such as
Walter Hallstein, the first President, Roy Jenkins during the 1970s,
and Jacques Delors today, have augmented the status of the Commission President. Today, the President is the principal shaper of the

Commission agenda in internal matters, and is the Commission's
spokesperson.

115

The Commission as a whole, and each Commissioner as department head, exerts enormous administrative authority.116 By virtue of
specific Treaty provisions, or more often through delegation of powers
from the Council, the Commission administers major spheres of Community action. It issues regulations, makes policy decisions, and supervises the bureaucracy's operations.1 17 The Commission, inter alia,
proposes all legislative texts;118 drafts the initial budget proposals, and
1 19 administers competition120
supervises Community expenditures;
and protective trade policies;121 administers the Common Agricul115 The President of the Commission is a member of the European Council along with the

Heads of State and Government of the Member States. SEA, supra note 6, at Title I, art. 2. It
would seem implicit that the President's role is to represent the Commission at the meetings of
the European Council. The President's role as Commission spokesperson to the general public
is based only on custom.
116 Each Commissioner is allocated one or two Directorates-General as his or her portfolio.
Commissioners devote a substantial part of their working time to supervision of these units and
have great influence in shaping Commission policy in the field of action represented in the
Directorates-General. The word "her" became realistic in 1989, when, for the first time, two
women became Commissioners.
117 Some articles give the Commission direct power to adopt regulations. EEC TREATY,
supra note 1, art. 33(7) (directives to facilitate the free movement of goods), art. 90 (directives
to limit state subsidies). Most Commission regulatory and decision-making powers come by
delegation from the Council through express legislative authority. Complicated systems have
been set up by the Council in the agricultural field, and subsequently in other areas, to ensure
that the Commission keeps working committees of the Council informed of proposed Commission action, and in some instances to enable the working committees to veto the proposed
action. KAPTEYN & VERLOREN VAN THEMAAT, supra note 11, at 240- 47.
118 In fact, one of the chief sources of the Commission's influence is the exclusive power to
draft legislation given to it by the Treaty in the generic description of the legislative process in
Article 149, and in the various specific grants of legislative power in other Treaty articles. The
Commission also supervises the progress of proposals through the various stages of examination and may alter the draft text at any time. EEC TREATY, supra note 1, art. 149(3).
119 The Commission prepares the preliminary draft budget. EEC TREATY, supra note 1,
art. 203(2). The Commission also implements the authorized spending. Id. art. 205.
120 Since the early 1960s, the Commission has followed a very active policy of challenging
and restricting anti-competitive market structures and practices. Its regulations and decisions
are voluminous and complicated. See supra note 74.
121 The Community has developed a major field of trade protective regulations since the late
1970s. The principal burden of investigation of complaints and adoption of protective measures against dumped or subsidized imports falls upon the Commission, although the Council
must also be involved in the final stage, and there are occasional appeals to the Court of Jus-
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tural Policy;122 ensures that Member States implement directives, and
otherwise fulfill their Treaty obligations; 123 and carries out studies
producing valuable reports in the economic, monetary, and social
fields. 124
While there is no dearth of evidence to demonstrate that the
Commission constitutes a powerful central administrative civil service
at the heart of Community operations, 125 there is no executive body
possessing authority analogous to that exercised by a president, prime
minister, or chancellor in national state systems. The President, and
the Commission as a whole, administratively implement Treaty-based
responsibilities, but have no great executive authority.
Turning next to the Council of Ministers, neither that body, nor
its President, can realistically be described as exercising significant executive authority.
The representative of each Member State serves as President of
the Council for a six-month term, with a listed order of succession
among the Member States. 126 Although Article 146 is silent as to the
role of the President of the Council of Ministers, the President does
tice. For an analysis of the principal rules and case law, see

BERMANN, GOEBEL, DAVEY &
Fox, supra note 11, chs. 29-30. See also J. F. BESELER & A. N. WILLIAMS, ANTI-DUMPING
AND ANTI-SUBsIDY LAW: THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (1986); Ivo VAN BAEL & JEANFRANgOIS BELLIS, ANTI-DUMPING AND OTHER TRADE PROTECTION LAWS OF THE EEC
(2d ed. 1990); EDWIN A. VERMULST, ANTIDUMPING LAW AND PRACTICE IN THE UNITED
STATES AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (1987).

122 The Commission has undoubtedly spent more time and effort in structuring the regulatory systems to implement the market organizations and other aspects of the CAP than on any
other Commission task. See supra note 71.
123 See the discussion of Article 169, infra notes 146-47.
124 In addition to the Annual General Reports made to the Parliament, the Commission
produces annual reports on agriculture, competition policy, consumer rights protection, environmental policy and social policy, all extremely valuable. The Commission produces a
wealth of other studies pursuant to express Treaty mandates, including Article 80, transport
studies, Article 118, social field studies, or to prepare the basis for legislative action, or provide
statistical and other information requested by the Council or Parliament. The many studies
and reports published are useful sources of data.
125 The Council of Ministers also has a central administrative presence through its Brussels
office. The Council's Committee of Permanent Representatives, or COREPER, substantially
assists the Council in the review of legislative or other action. EEC TREATY, supra note 1, art.
151. Working groups and committees in Brussels provide expertise in particular sectors and
facilitate relations with the Commission and the Parliament. In 1991 the Council's permanent
staff numbered 3062. XXVTH GENERAL REPORT, supra note 57, 1161.
126 EEC TREATY, supra note 1, art. 146. Interestingly, Article 146 does not specify any role
for the President, although it seems implicit in the title that he or she, or an authorized representative, chair all meetings of the Council. By custom, this prerogative of chairing meetings
extends to all working groups or other lower level gatherings of representatives of Member
States.

1993] COMMUNITY BRAND OF ECONOMICFEDERALISM 193
more than chair Council meetings. In the last decade, the Head of
Government of each Member State tends to set the agenda for the
Council during that State's six-month term. 127 Determined advocacy
by the State representative when chairing meetings often significantly
advances a proposal toward adoption by the Council.
A six-month period is far too short for any Council President to
have any long-term influence on Council operations. To facilitate
continuity, in recent years a cooperative troika arrangement has
linked the office of the current President with that of his or her inmediate predecessor. This can, however, only have limited impact.
In one respect, the Council as a whole serves as a collective executive: the Council enters into any international agreements on behalf
of the Community within the scope of the Community's external relations and trade powers. 12 8 Moreover, the Council shapes external and
trade relations, inasmuch as the Council directs the Commission,
which has the exclusive power to negotiate agreements,1 2 9 to enter
into negotiations, and gives guidance during the course of the dealings
1 30
with third-party states or within GATT.
As for the European Council, that body can also be said to exercise executive authority in a certain sense, because its policy decisions
tangibly shape later Community action. The European Council, composed of the Heads of State or Government of the Member States,
received formal status through Title I of the Single European Act. In
fact, however, the European Council has met regularly, two or three
times a year, since President Pompidou of France invited the other
State leaders to summit meetings starting in 1969.131 The SEA does
not delineate any specific rule for the European Council. In practice,
its meetings serve as fora to debate political issues that the Council
has not been able to resolve, to decide questions of long-term policy,
127 In recent years, the custom has developed that the incoming Council President indicates
his or her agenda and policy views in information releases. The agenda is summarized in the
monthly EC Bulletin.
128 EEC TREATY, supra note 1, art. 228(1).
129 Id.
130 Article 113, which describes how the Community should fashion and carry out its CCP,
contains Section (3) which indicates that the Council authorizes all Commission negotiations
with third states. Id. Section (3) further requires the Commission to follow any Council negotiating directives and to coordinate with a Council committee, commonly called 113 committees. Id. The Council makes active use of Article 113(3).
131 The Pais summit meeting of December 9-10, 1974 decided that these meetings should
be held regularly, at least three times a year. The SEA gave the European Council its formal
name, in use since the early 1980s, and prescribed that it meet at least twice a year, but attributed it neither a specific role nor particular powers. SEA, supra note 6, Title I, art. 2.
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to launch new programs of action, and to issue major statements of a
political character.132 Among the latter have been the Stuttgart Declaration on European Union in 1983,133 the Copenhagen Declaration
on Democracy in 1978,134 and the Social Charter in 1989.131
By virtue of the personal authority wielded by the Heads of State
or Government, the European Council represents in a certain sense
the most powerful political body in the Community. However, the
European Council never takes any binding legal action, leaving this to
the regular Community institutions. It would therefore be inaccurate
to characterize the European Council as a collective executive, as is,
for example, the Federal Council in Switzerland.
In conclusion, the Community manifestly has a powerful center
for administration in the Commission. The Commission as a collective body, and each Commissioner individually, directs and supervises
the process of issuing regulations and decisions to supplement legislation, of enforcing Community law, of controlling Community expenditures, and of carrying out general administrative authority. Within
the Commission, its President has attained a particularly high level of
influence in developing policies and acting as Commission
spokesperson.
On the other hand, neither the Commission nor its President, nor
the Council or its President, nor the European Council constitutes a
central executive authority commensurate in any degree with the
chief executive in a national state. Although all three bodies exercise
a certain level of executive power in particular sectors, and the European Council certainly represents the highest level of policy-making
power, a true executive structure is clearly lacking.
To some degree, this is the principal reason why observers tend
to doubt that the Community can properly be characterized as a federal state. It is, perhaps, a bit hard to conceive of a federal system
that lacks a single powerful executive.
132 BERMANN, GOEBEL, DAVEY & Fox,

supra note 11, at 55-57;

KAPTEYN

&

VERLOREN

VAN THEMAAT, supra note 11, at 25-27.

133 See supra note 8.
134 The Copenhagen Declaration on Democracy indicated that the Community would
"safeguard the principles of representative democracy, of the rule of law, of social justice and
of respect for human rights." E.C. Bull. 1978/3, at 6. The Declaration concluded with the
admonition that "respect for and maintenance of representative democracy and human rights
in each Member State are essential elements of membership." Id. This represented an implied
warning to Greece, Spain, and Portugal, then applicants, that they could not revert to authoritarian regimes.
135 The Community Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights for Workers, supra note 67.
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C. JudicialAuthority
In considering the sovereign powers transferred from constituent
states to a central governmental structure, judicial authority does not,
at first glance, bulk very large. But, on further reflection, the exercise
of significant judicial authority by the central government does indeed
represent a very important part of a federal or supranational system.
The Treaty of Rome created a rather unusual judicial system.
The sole Community court was the Court of Justice, sometimes called
the European Court of Justice. 13 6 The Treaty did not create a system
of district or trial courts to serve with the Court of Justice; rather, the
existing national courts in each Member State were directed to apply
Community law. Although the Single European Act authorized the
creation of a Court of First Instance (CFI) to supplement the Court of
Justice,13 7 the CFI does not in any way substitute for national courts.
The rule of the CFI is to handle trials involving disputes between
Community institutions and their employees, and to provide an initial
appellate review of Commission decisions in competition proceedings
and in the administration of the ECSC. 13 8
The Court of Justice was probably intended by the Treaty draftsmen to have a rather minor role in the overall Community structure. 139 In fact, however, the Court has assumed a major role,
developing legal doctrines such as the direct effect of certain Treaty
articles and the primacy of Community law over national law, including the preemption doctrine, which have significantly enhanced the
authority of the Community vis-a-vis its constituent Member
States."W Equally important, the Court has broadly interpreted the
scope of fundamental Community fields of action as set out in the
Treaty or secondary legislation, thus further expanding Community

authority. 141
The EEC Treaty accorded the Court two quite natural roles.
136 EEC TREATY, supra note 1, arts. 164-88. The Court's institutional structure and jurisdiction is described in KAPTEYN & VERLOREN VAN THEMAAT, supra note 11, at 145-73, and
in SCHERMERS, supra note 11.

137 EEC TREATY, supra note 1, art. 168a, as amended by SEA, supra note 6, art. 11.
138 These are the classes of actions which the Council has thus far transferred from the
Court of Justice to the Court of First Instance. There are pending proposals to add others.
Article 168a permits a right of appeal on questions of law only from the Court of First Instance to the Court of Justice. EEC TREATY, supra note 1, art. 168.
139 Hjalte Rasmussen, The Court ofJustice, in COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, THIRTY YEARS OF COMMUNITY LAW 190 (1983).

140 See supra Part I.
141 Supra notes 51 and 62.
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The first was to serve as an appellate review tribunal for the administrative and quasi-judicial decisions of the Commission, or, occasionally, the Council. The second was to decide whether Member States
were properly fulfilling their obligations under the Treaty or secondary legislation, usually in an Article 169 proceeding brought by the
Commission or, more rarely, in an Article 170 proceeding brought by
one Member State against another.
The Court has acted quite effectively in both roles. As an appellate review tribunal, the Court has not only examined the substantive
legal justification for Community administrative and quasi-judicial
decisions, it has also established a system of procedural rights and
elements of a fair hearing that all Community institutions must respect. 142 Moreover, the Court has broadly interpreted its own appellate authority to encompass the review of Community legislation, to
ensure that the proper procedures have been followed, 113 that the ap144
propriate Treaty legal basis has been used in adopting legislation,
and that the legislation accords with higher norms of basic rights. 145
The Court has also been eminently successful in its role as adjudicator in proceedings to determine whether Member States have
properly filled their Treaty obligations. Since the 1970s, the volume
of Article 169 proceedings has increased enormously. In recent years
the Court decides an average of sixty cases per year. 146 Manifestly,
the Court has had occasion to review a considerable variety of issues
and Member State defenses. The Community's success is evident
142 Supra note 32.

143 See S. A. Roquette Fr6res, supra note 103 (Council regulation invalidated for failure to
consult the Parliament, a procedural requirement for agricultural legislation under Article 43).
144 See, e.g., Case C-300-89, Commission v. Council (Titanium-dioxide), 1991 E.C.R. (not yet reported) (Council directive invalidated because based on Article 130s instead of
100a); Case 68/86, United Kingdom v. Council (Agricultural hormones), 1988 E.C.R. 855
(Council directive based on Article 43 upheld against a challenge claiming that Article 100
should have been the legal basis).

145 See supra note 27 and accompanying text for a discussion of Internationale Handelsgesellschaft. The Court in this decision, and frequently in others, has reviewed Community
legislation by applying the doctrine of proportionality, derived from German and French administrative law, to determine whether aspects of the legislation go further than necessary to
achieve its goal. In the famous Skimmed-milk powder case, the Court invalidated an agricultural regulation because it violated the principle of proportionality by imposing a discriminatory economic burden on animal feed producers in order to benefit dairy farmers. Case 114/
76, Bela-Miihle Josef Bergmann KG v. Grows-Farm GmbH, 1977 E.C.R. 1211.
146 At the end of the Commission's Annual General Reports to Parliament there are charts

which break down the Court's caseload for the year which is the subject of the report. In 1991
the Commission brought 59 Article 169 proceedings, and the Court decided 62 of those cases.
XXVTH GENERAL REPORT, supra note 57, Annexes, Table 2.
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from the fact that the Court decides against the Member States in
almost ninety percent of the cases, but the Member States always ultimately comply with the decisions. 4 7
A more surprising success of the Court has come in its role as
guide and teacher for national courts in their enforcement of Community law. As noted above, Community trial courts were not created
by the Treaty of Rome, nor have they been added by the SEA or the
Maastricht Treaty (despite proposals to do so). Instead, the EEC
Treaty imitated the German and Italian systems for the referral of
constitutional law questions by other courts to the Constitutional
Court.
Member State trial and appellate courts may refer questions of
Community law to the Court of Justice, and courts of last appeal
must refer such questions. 148 The questions referred must be "necessary" to the national court proceeding, a term that is not without
ambiguity. The Court of Justice has interpreted "necessary" broadly.
In practice it means that the Court will answer any question relevant
to the outcome of the national proceeding.14 9 The Court's responses
are not merely opinions or suggestions; they represent a binding statement of Community law which the referring court, and any other
court dealing then or later with the identical issue, is obligated to follow. 15 0 The primacy of Community law doctrine takes on enormous
importance in this context, because in the national courts employing
147 On occasion, a Member State is dilatory in complying with the Court's judgment, so
that the Commission brings a new proceeding under Article 171 to enforce the prior judgment.
The leading precedent on this is Case 48/71, Commission v. Italy (Second art treasures), 1972
E.C.R. 527.
148 EEC TREATY, supra note 1, art. 177. There is a considerable volume of literature on

Article 177. Some valuable articles are: Anthony Arnull, References to the European Court,
15 EUR. L. REv. 375 (1990); Gerhard Bebr, The Reinforcement of the ConstitutionalReview of
Community Acts under Article 177 EEC Treaty, 25 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 667 (1988); Manfred A. Dauses, Practical ConsiderationsRegarding the PreliminaryRuling Procedure under

Article 177, 10 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 538 (1987); Hjalte Rasmussen, The European Court's
Acte ClairStrategy in CILFIT, 9 EUR. L. REV. 242 (1984). See also SCHERMERS, supra note

11, at 390-446.
149 Case 283/81, Srl CILFIT v. Ministry of Health, 1982 E.C.R. 3415 (the leading judg-

ment interpreting the scope and use of Article 177). In response to questions of the Italian
Supreme Court, the Court of Justice indicated that national courts may refer questions under
Article 177 whenever the questions are relevant to their resolution of a pending proceeding.
National courts need not refer questions if "there is no scope for any reasonable doubt" as to
their answer. Id. 16.
150 Id.
13-14. However, a national court may raise again a question which the Court of
Justice has already answered in a prior case, id. 15, presumably in order to see if the Court
might modify significantly the prior answer.
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Article 177, the Court of Justice's Community law enunciation
supercedes any conflicting national law norm, even one of constitutional law. 151
Article 177 in practice has proved to have an astonishing level of
success. National courts have increasingly used the reference process,
so that in recent years Article 177 proceedings constitute more than
half the Court's caseload; on average, over one hundred decisions a
year. 152 Although Member State supreme and constitutional courts
were initially reluctant to use Article 177, today they are more willing
to do so.
The Article 177 procedure has enabled an extraordinary variety
of issues to reach the Court of Justice. As former Judge Pierre Pescatore has aptly noted, the Court's most important doctrines were ar53
ticulated in large measure through its responses to national courts.1
Surprisingly, the national courts have generally been quite willing to
follow the Court's evolving Community law doctrines, even when the
doctrines conflict with national norms. To some degree, this may reflect an informal function of the Court; for many years its Judges have
viewed their duties to include frequent participation in national judicial conferences and meetings, where they engage in direct dialogues
with their national confreres.
It is indeed probable that the Article 177 reference mechanism
has proved more successful than a system of Community trial courts
might have been. As it has evolved, the Article 177 approach has
achieved a widespread acceptance of Community doctrines at the national court level, in effect making the national judges the allies of the
Court of Justice in promoting the development of Community law. A
system of Community trial courts might well have created jealousy
between the Community and national courts, complicated issues of
jurisdiction, and reduced the willingness of national courts to recognize Community law.
151 Case 106/77, Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v. Simmenthal S.p.A., 1978
E.C.R. 629; Case C-213/89, The Queen v. Secretary of State for Transport ex parte
Factortame Ltd., 1990 E.C.R. 1-2443.
152 XXVTH GENERAL REPORT, supra note 57, Annexes, Table 2.
153 Former Judge Pierre Pescatore of the Court of Justice has said that use of Article 177
has provided the Court with questions enabling its "most conspicuous contribution to the
development of Community law... [including] the direct effect of Community law, its primacy over national law, the protection of fundamental rights, the principles relating to the
common market and the law of competition [and] the social dimension of the Community...." PIERRE PESCATORE, REFERENCES FOR PRELIMINARY RULINGS UNDER ARTICLE
177 (1986).
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One gap in the Community judicial system is evident. This is the
absence of any form of appeal from a court of last resort in a Member
State to the Court of Justice. No system of recourse exists, if a court
of last resort misapplies Community law without referring to the
Court of Justice, or inaccurately applies the Court's answer after such
a reference. While admittedly such occasions have been few, they do
occur.1 54 It seems unfortunate that to date the Member States have
not been willing to accept any form of appeal on Community law issues from their supreme courts to the Court of Justice.
Delay in the proceedings in the Court of Justice pose a more
pragmatic problem. Because the issues are often complex, and the
Commission and Member States frequently intervene to add their
views to those of the parties directly involved, the Court's proceedings
customarily take one to two years.15 5 Such a time delay is perhaps an
unfortunate concomitant of any appellate review, and therefore inevitable in Article 173 proceedings. The problem is more acute in Article 177 reference proceedings, because the delay in the Court's
response must be added to the length of the national court's own
procedures.
In conclusion, the judicial structure of the Community has
proved, in general, to be very effective. Each of the principal types of
proceedings - those under Articles 169, 173, and 177 - have been
more successful than could have been optimistically foreseen in 1958.
The Court of Justice itself has been consistently composed of
judges who have not only been competent legal scholars, but have
been animated by a pioneering constitutional vision.'5 6 The Court of
Justice has attained an extraordinary degree of respect and deference,
both from the other Community institutions and from the Member
154 Probably the most famous instance occurred when the Conseil d'Etat, the French
Supreme Administrative Court, held that a Community directive on the right of residence of
migrant workers did not have direct effect, despite well-known Court of Justice case law to the
contrary. Judgment of December 22, 1978 (Ministre de l'Interieur v. Cohn-Bendit), [1979]
Recueil Dalloz 155, translated in 1 C.M.L.R. 543 (1980). The German Supreme Tax Court
came to the same conclusion, citing Cohn-Bendit, in a case involving a value added tax directive, but was reversed by the German Constitutional Court, which held that the Supreme Tax
Court was bound by the precedents of the Court of Justice. Judgment of April 8, 1987, Application of Frau Kloppenburg, 75 BVerfGE 223, translatedin 3 C.M.L.R. 1 (1988).
155 Statisticalinformationfrom the Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance, 17 EUR.
L. REV. 189 (1992).
156 Among those best known for their contributions to the Court's constitutional developments in the 1960s and 1970s were Judges Donner (Dutch), Kutscher (German), Lecourt
(French), Lord Mackenzie Stuart (Scottish), Mertens de Wilmars (Belgian), and Pescatore
(Luxembourger).
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State governments and courts. As was noted earlier, the Court's legal
doctrines, particularly those affecting the constitutional structure,
have shaped the nature and role of the Community to an extraordinary degree. If the Community can accurately be described as a federal system, substantial credit goes to the Court of Justice's vision.
IV.

MAASTRICHT TREATY MODIFICATIONS TO THE
COMMUNITY'S SCOPE AND STRUCTURE

Ever since the European Council adopted the Stuttgart Declaration on European Union in 1984, the Community has been animated
by a growing movement to achieve greater powers for the central institutions, a higher level of democratic legitimacy, and a broader field
of operations. The drafting of the Single European Act represented
only a limited step in the achievement of these goals. However, the
successful implementation of all the important aspects of the Single
European Act and, perhaps even more, the successful execution of
most of the legislative program contained in the Commission's 1985
White Paper on Completing the Internal Market, incited renewed efforts to advance the Community toward European Union.
After a certain amount of internal debate, sharpened by the reluctance of the United Kingdom to modify the essential Community
structure, the Dublin European Council on June 25-26, 1990 decided
to convene two intergovernmental conferences in Rome in December
1990, the first to consider the creation of an economic and monetary
union, and the second to review proposals to revise the political structure of the Community. 157 These Rome conferences, held in accordance with the EEC Treaty amendment procedures, 15 labored
intensively, often with periods of difficult debate and strong difference
of views. The most serious disputes were submitted to the Maastricht
European Council on December 9-10, 1991, which, somewhat surprisingly, was able to find compromise solutions for virtually all
issues. 5 9
157 E.C. Bull. 1990/6, at f 1.35. The agenda for the two conferences was set by a special
European Council meeting in Rome in October 1990. E.C. Bull. 1990/10, at V 1.14. For
further details on the planning and references to the supportive views of the Commission and
the Parliament, see COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, XXIVTH GENERAL REPORT OF THE ACTIVrTEs OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 1990, at 32-36 (1991) [hereinafter XXIVTH GENERAL REPORT].
158 EEC TREATY, supra note 1, art. 236. This article provides that the Council of Ministers
may call such an intergovernmental conference to consider amendments, but does not prescribe the vote required. The Council acted despite the reservations of the United Kingdom.
159 The ongoing conduct of the Rome Intergovernmental Conferences, together with a sum-
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The resulting text, which combined amendments of the EEC,
ECSC, and Euratom Treaties with entirely new fields of action encompassed under the rubric of European Union, was signed by the
Member States on February 7, 1992 in Maastricht as the Treaty on
European Union. 16° Ratification was thought to require the rest of
1992,161 but the ratification process has proved far more difficult than
anyone had foreseen, particularly after the narrow Danish rejection of
the TEU by a 51%-49% margin in a referendum in June 1992.
The successful outcome of the French referendum in September
1992, albeit by an equally narrow margin, has made it likely that the
Treaty on European Union will ultimately be ratified by all the Member States (although slightly modified by a Declaration of the December 1992 Edinburgh European Council intended to incite the Danes to
vote in favor). The process will certainly take until mid-1993. It is
still possible that the United Kingdom Parliament will reject the
Treaty, despite its endorsement by Prime Minister Major, and Denmark's second referendum may reach the same result as the first. If
rejected by either country, the Maastricht Treaty would either be
abandoned or would have to be significantly modified to enable the
other Member States to move ahead in a two-tiered Community
structure without the United Kingdom, which is not likely, or without Denmark, which is at least within the realm of possibility. However, since the present view is one of guarded optimism that both the
United Kingdom and Denmark will eventually ratify the TEU, we
will now consider how that would modify the scope and institutional
structure described in Parts II and III above.
mary of the principal conclusions after the Maastricht European Council, is described in
XXVTH GENERAL REPORT, supra note 57, at 5-13. The most important compromises
achieved by the Maastricht European Council related to the process of movement toward
EMU, and to the Social Protocol, discussed infra in the text at note 204. Among the important issues which could not be compromised were those concerning the number of members of
the Commission and of the Parliament, both matters intended for further review. See TEU,
supra note 2, Declaration 15 on the number of members of the Commission and of the European Parliament. The proposal to give Germany eighteen additional members of Parliament,
in view of its greater population since reunification, was particularly sensitive, because it would
end the even balance of representation among France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom. The December 1992 Edinburgh European Council has now decided that Germany
should have eighteen additional members of Parliament.
160 TEU, supra note 2.
161 The TEU foresaw the completion of ratification before January 1, 1993. TEU, supra
note 2, art. R(2). Since that date has proved to be too optimistic, the TEU will enter into effect
on the first day of the month following deposit of the instrument of ratification by the last
signatory state. Id.
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The Scope of the European Union After Maastricht

The TEU is intended to substantially augment the powers of the
European Community. The Preamble refers to it as a "new stage in
the process of European integration," 162 while Article A formally describes the supranational structure being created as the "European
Union," or simply "the Union." This structure is founded on the
prior Communities but has new institutional aspects and fields of operation. As noted at the outset of this essay, the word "federal" was
not used to modify the word "Union," but the Community's structure
as modified by the TEU certainly has enhanced federal
63

characteristics. 1

Trying to understand the structure and scope of the new European Union is quite a task, because the TEU mixes articles setting out
modifications in the present European Community with articles
describing new and somewhat separate institutions and operations.
The TEU is further complicated, because much of the text reflects
compromises. Accordingly, initial broad statements are then modified by limitative ones. The very complexity of the TEU has undoubtedly hampered the ratification process, because it is much easier to
point to language that appears adverse to particular interest groups,
than to describe the over-all new features that are beneficial.
Simplifying greatly, we will briefly describe the four principal aspects of the European Union, and then note the modifications in scope
made in the present European Community.
The creation of an EMU has received the principal attention in
commentary on the TEU. In fact, economic and monetary coordination was a feature, albeit a secondary one, of the EEC Treaty."
Community monetary coordination efforts became substantial after
the breakdown of the Bretton Wood international fixed-exchange rate
monetary structure in 1969. After a period of crises in the 1970s, the
Community succeeded in creating the European Monetary System in
1979, 165 even though the United Kingdom and several other Member
162 TEU, supra note 2. Two excellent analyses of the effect of the TEU are Everling, supra
note 12, and John Pinder, The Community afterMaastricht:How Federal?,5 N. EUR. Q. REV.
5 (1992).
163 The Commission tersely observed that "the federal nature of the union was not highlighted at Maastricht." XXVTH GENERAL REPORT, supra note 57, at 12.
164 EEC TREATY, supra note 1, arts. 103-109. An important advisory body is the Monetary
Committee, which was created to work toward economic and monetary policy coordination.
Id. art. 105(2). This Committee's work has been supplemented since 1964 by the Committee
of Governors of Central Banks.
165 The EMS was created after a policy decision taken at the European Council meeting at
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States, decided not to participate in its system of quasi-fixed rates (the
Exchange Rate Mechanism, or ERM) until 1990 or later.
Buoyed by the success of the internal market program, new efforts to develop an EMU were launched. In April 1989, a committee,
chaired by President Delors and composed principally of national
central bank representatives, presented a report outlining the proposed features of an EMU and setting forth concrete stages of action
to attain it.166 This Delors Report, together with further Commission
and Member State proposals, provided the grist for the mill during
1 67
the Rome Intergovernmental Conference review.
The TEU provisions on the EMU, supplemented by Protocols,
are extremely complicated. They provide for three successive stages
in monetary coordination, 168 marked by the elimination of exchange
regulations, 69 better control of deficit spending, inflation rates, and
interest rates by Member States, 170 and the progressive development
of monetary institutions, notably the European System of Central
Banks (ESCB) and a European Central Bank (ECB), 17 ' molded
largely on the U.S. Federal Reserve Board model. The ultimate goal
is not only a system of monetary stability monitored and regulated by
Bremen in August 1978. E.C. Bull. 1978/6, at 17-18. For a description of the EMS, see
BERMANN, GOEBEL, DAVEY & Fox, supra note 11, ch. 35B. For additional detail, see THE
EMS, supra note 83.
166 The Delors Committee Report, available from the Commission Information Service, is
summarized in E.C. Bull. 1989/4, at 8-9. It is commented upon in Jean-Victor Louis, A Monetary Union for Tomorrow?, 26 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 301 (1989).
167 See XXVTH GENERAL REPORT, supra note 57, at 6-9.
168 The Community is already in the first stage and is scheduled to start the second stage on
January 1, 1994. EEC TREATY, supra note 1, as amended by TEU, supra note 2, art. 109e.
The third stage, including its monetary coordination goal of a single currency, is scheduled to
begin by January 1, 1999. Id. at art. 109j(4).
169 This was largely achieved by a major directive in 1988 which required the abolition of
Member State exchange controls and other restrictions on the free movement of capital by July
1, 1990. Temporary derogations were permitted until 1993 for Spain and Portugal, and until
1995 for Greece and Ireland. Council Directive 88/361, 1988 O.J. (L 178) 5. The EEC Treaty,
as amended by the TEU, would generally prohibit any intra-Community restrictions on the
free movement of capital. EEC TREATY, supra note 1,as amended by TEU, supra note 2, art.
73. See generally, Andrew Gamble, EMU and European CapitalMarkets: Towards a Unified
FinancialMarket, 28 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 319 (1991).
170 The TEU and related Protocols set up precise goals for all three items to be attained by
Member States during the second stage. Achievement of these goals is a condition for moving
to the third stage. EEC TREATY, supra note 1, as amended by TEU, supra note 2, arts. 104
and 109j.
171 The nature, rules, and operations of the ESCB and the ECB are described in EEC
TREATY, supra note 1, as amended by TEU, arts. 105-109, together with related Protocols.
See generally Hugo J. Hahn, The European CentralBank- Key to European Monetary Union or
Target?, 28 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 783 (1991).
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the ESCB and ECB, but also a single European currency, to be set in
place no later than January 1, 1999.172
The TEU monetary provisions expressly provide for a two-tier
Europe. Member States which satisfy prescribed conditions of monetary stability will move to the final stage and the adoption of a European currency, while other States remain outside the system pending
their attainment of the prescribed conditions.
Manifestly, the attainment of an EMU, particularly one marked
by a single European currency, would have tremendous political and
social implications well beyond its economic and monetary features.
One of the most sensitive aspects of political governance is control of
the national budget, finances, and fundamental economic policy. The
creation of an EMU would mean the transfer of a vast power in these
spheres from Member State governments to the Union. This would
mean a very palpable transfer of sovereignty to the Council of Ministers, and to the new ESCB and ECB.
During the ratification debates, no other aspect of the TEU has
proved more controversial. As an essential compromise during the
Maastricht European Council, the United Kingdom was given a specific right to opt out of participation in the final stage of an EMU and
the European currency. 7 3 The December 1992 Edinburgh Council
has now issued a Declaration giving Denmark the same right, in order
to induce it to ratify the TEU. 74
Moreover, the monetary crisis of September 1992, has shattered,
at least temporarily, the EMS. This crisis was provoked in some measure by fear that the French would not ratify the TEU, but it was
caused fundamentally by the sharp divergence in monetary policies
between Germany, which maintained high interest rates to combat
inflation after German unification, and the United Kingdom and most
other Member States, which needed low interest rates and deficits to
combat recession. In view of the likely inability to achieve a convergence of monetary policies between Germany and other Member
States, the progress toward an eventual EMU is certain to be slower
and far less effective. Even if the TEU is ratified, its monetary provisions are unlikely to be carried out within the foreseen time frame.
Whether the Union can ever attain a strong functional central bank
172 EEC TREATY, supra note 1, as amended by TEU, supra note 2, art. 109j(4).
173 The UK has "no obligation" to move to the third stage of the EMU. TEU, supra note 2,
Protocol on Certain Provisions Relating to the United Kingdom, par. 1.
174 See infra note 285.
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system with the ECB working within the ESCB, and a single currency, is very much open to doubt.
The second major aspect of the Union is the proposed foreign
policy and security coordination. Building on the European Political
Cooperation (EPC) system of coordination of foreign policy that presently exists, 17' Article J of the TEU provides for a closer mode of
coordination on foreign policy and expands it to include security policy. 176 The detailed provisions would enable for the first time the tak-

ing of certain foreign policy decisions by qualified majority voting,
1 77
eliminating the present need to attain a consensus on all issues.
Certainly, if the TEU does result in a functional system of foreign and security policy coordination on the basis of qualified majority voting, with the outvoted States loyally abiding by the decision
taken, this would represent a significant transfer of sovereignty to the
Union in a very sensitive area.
Unfortunately, although it is still within the realm of possibility
that the TEU provisions in this sector may still be implemented after
ratification, the auguries at present are unfavorable. The civil war in
the former Yugoslavia, and particularly the bitter fighting in BosniaHerzegovenia, has posed an acute crisis in the present EPC decision
making. The Member States have not been able to reach a consensus
on how strongly to react to the aggression of Serbian militias, supported by the former Yugoslav government. They had great difficulty
in deciding when to recognize Slovenia and Croatia as independent
republics and have not been able to achieve a consensus to recognize
Macedonia as of this writing.1 78 As for security coordination, the
Member States presently have no mechanism to field a security force
to intervene in the Bosnian conflict, and it may be seriously doubted
175 SEA, supra note 6, Title III. See supra note 82.
176 Member States are required to "define and implement a common foreign and security
policy." TEU, supra note 2, art. J.l. "[C]ommon positions" agreed upon by the Council, in
accord with guidelines from the European Council, pursuant to article J.8, are binding upon
Member States. Id. art. J.2. Where security policy requires a "common defence policy," the
Western European Union is to provide a mechanism for action. Id. art. J.2.
177 TEU, supra note 2, art. J.3.
178 It is generally believed that Germany's expressed intent to recognize Croatia and Slovenia placed pressure on more reluctant Member States to adopt a common policy of recognition
in the spring of 1992. Macedonia has still not been recognized due to Greece's opposition to
that republic's adoption of the name, "Macedonia," because "Macedonia" is also the name of a
northern region of Greece. This has prevented the Council of Foreign Ministers from attaining
unanimity. Eduardo Cue, EC Shuns "Rump" Yugoslavia, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR,
May 4, 1992, at 2.
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that they would be able to agree upon such a force, even if the TEU's
Article J were in effect.
The TEU's Article K on Cooperation in Justice and Home Affairs represents another new sector for the Union. Article K enables
cooperative action in the fields of a common immigration policy and
system of visas, a common asylum policy, and the coordination of
police action against terrorism, drug-dealing, and international fraud
or other crimes. 179 Moreover, the EEC Treaty would be amended to
permit legislation to attain a common visa policy. 8 0 After January 1,
1996 such legislation could be adopted by a qualified majority.1"'
Implementation of Article K would fill a serious gap in present
Community law. Although the Commission's 1985 White Paper
characterized the border controls of physical persons at national frontiers as one of the most evident symbols of division in the Community,18 2 only limited progress has been made to eliminate these
controls. Member States, notably the United Kingdom, have expressed concern that ending frontier controls would hamper the combat of terrorism and drug traffic, and hence would pose an
83
unacceptable security risk.1
Article K, coupled with the EEC Treaty Article 100c, might enable significant progress through the attainment of harmonized visa
and asylum measures and through significant levels of Justice Ministry and police cooperation. Unfortunately, again the auguries are not
promising. The ratification debates and political problems, notably in
France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, have revealed the strong
opposition of large groups to any Community or Union measures that
179 Article K deliberately uses the word "cooperation" rather than "harmonization" and
enables only a limited degree of joint decision. TEU, supra note 2, art. K.
180 EEC TREATY, supra note 1, as amended by TEU, supra note 2, art. 100c.
181 Id. at 100c(3). By unanimous vote, the Council may expand the legislative scope of
Article 100c to include general immigration policy, asylum policy, and measures to combat
drug-dealing and international fraud. TEU, supra note 2, art. K.9.
182 The White Paper called for the end of routine control of physical persons at intra-Community frontiers because these are "to the ordinary citizen... the obvious manifestation of the
continued division of the Community." White Paper, supra note 54, 24. As part of its
"People's Europe" Program, the European Council urged Community action for the "abolition of all police and customs formalities for people crossing intra-Community frontiers." E.C,
Bull. 1985/7 Supp., at 104. For a brief description of the People's Europe Program and the
border control issue, see BERMANN, GOEBEL, DAVEY & Fox, supra note 11, ch. 14A.
183 Because implementing legislation for the entire Community has been blocked, most of
the Member States have entered into the Schengen Accord to end frontier-crossing controls,
harmonize visa requirements, and cooperate on drug and terrorism control. Even this Accord
has not yet been ratified by their parliaments. See Julian J. E. Schutte, Schengen: Its Meaning
for the Free Movement of Persons in Europe, 28 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 549 (1991).
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would reduce national control of immigration, visa or asylum policies.
It is likely that the pace of progress in this sphere will be slow indeed.
The final important aspect of the Union is the creation of the
status of citizenship of the Union."8 4 Every Union citizen, defined in
terms of each Member State's recognition of the status of a national of
that State, would have the right to "move and reside freely" anywhere
in the Community. This goes further than the present EEC Treaty's
recognition of such rights for workers and the self-employed.18
Another aspect of citizenship would have considerable symbolic
value. Citizens of the Union would be permitted to vote and to be
candidates for office in municipal elections in any Member State in
which they are resident, even though they are nationals of another
Member State. 18 6 In like manner, they would be entitled to vote for
members of the European Parliament in their State of residence. Legislative proposals to achieve this result were initially made in 1989 as
part of the People's Europe Program, 87 but have not advanced significantly to date. Manifestly, ending the customary restriction on voting to a Member State's own nationals has great supranational
symbolism. It fosters the creation of a sense of citizenship in the federal, or supranational, Union. However, this provision has generated
considerable opposition to the TEU during the ratification process.
Finally, the TEU would amend the EEC Treaty to add, at least
formally, several spheres of action. The TEU would add consumer
protection, 18 8 a purely formal addition, since the Community has had
an extensive consumer protection legislative program since 1975,
making use of its general harmonization of laws powers.18 9 More consequential are the additions of education, culture and public health as
184 Stated as a principle in Article B and provided for specifically in an EEC Treaty amendment, a new Article 8. The present famous Article 8a on completing the internal market
would be renumbered as Article 7a.
185 The legislation cited in note 98 supra would largely achieve a right of residence for all
Community nationals, but the TEU provision would, of course, have Treaty force and represent a new fundamental right.
186 TEU, supra note 2, art. 8b.
187 Amended Commission Proposal for a Council Directive on voting rights for Community
nationals in local elections in their Member State of residence, 1989 O.J. (C 290) 1. Part of the
delay is due to the fact that at least half of the Member States must amend their constitutions
to permit non-nationals to vote.
188 TEU, supra note 2, art. 129a.
189 See Council Resolution of April 14, 1975 on a Preliminary Programme of the European
Economic Community for a Consumer Protection and Information Policy, 1975 O.J. (C 92) 2.
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Community fields of action.190 Although the Community has
adopted limited measures in these fields as ancillary to present fields
of action, such as measures concerning the education of migrant
workers' children,191 or the Erasmus program to encourage cross-border studies and research in higher education,192 the TEU amendments
would considerably extend the scope of Community initiatives.
To sum up, the TEU, if ratified, would substantially expand the
spheres of present Community activity, in particular by its creation of
an economic and monetary union. The powers that would be granted
to the Union to coordinate foreign and security policy, as well as
those to coordinate immigration policy and police action against drug
traffic and terrorism, are also highly important. The creation of the
concept and sense of citizenship of the Union should not be
underestimated.
The difficulties in ratification, and the complications caused by
sharp differences in monetary policy between Germany and other
States, have certainly demonstrated that the use which is apt to be
made of the new powers by the Union and the Community may be
quite limited, especially in the near term. It is unlikely that the goal
of an EMU will be met by 1999 and quite possible that the TEU provisions will be further amended, or not implemented, so that an
EMU, if achieved, will be significantly different from the current
proposals.
Moreover, the TEU added a new principle of operation in its
enunciation of the concept of subsidiarity in a new EEC Treaty Article 3b. This article states essentially that the Community should not
undertake action within its sphere of powers if measures can be more
effectively or appropriately taken at the Member State level. 193 This
principle of subsidiarity was first enunciated in the SEA's extension of
Community action to the sphere of environmental protection. 194 The
doctrine will now apply to all Treaty fields of action.
What precisely is meant by subsidiarity, and how the concept
should be applied in particular instances, are both issues generating
190 EEC TREATY, supra note 1, as amended by TEU, supra note 2, arts. 126, 128 and 129,
respectively.
191 Council Directive 77/486, 1977 O.J. (L 199) 32.
192 Council Decision 87/327, 1987 O.J. (L 166) 20. When challenged, the Erasmus program was upheld as an appropriate exercise of Council legislative power largely under Article
128 on vocational training. Case 242/87, Commission v. Council (Erasmus), 1939 E.C.R.
1425.
193 TEU, supra note 2, art. 3b.
194 EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 130r(4).
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intense debate and considerable uncertainty. 195 The ratification debates have demonstrated that the concept of subsidiarity has great
appeal to political leaders and the population at large in several Member States, not surprisingly including the UK. The concept is likely to
receive substantial application in practice. If so, this might mean a
reduction of the volume of future Community legislation.
B.

The InstitutionalStructure After Maastricht

The Maastricht Treaty would make several important changes in
Community structure, all accentuating its federal or supranational
character. Paralleling the presentation in Part III, we will initially
discuss the legislative process, then administrative powers, and finally
judicial authority.
The best known change in the legislative process produced by the
TEU would be the creation of a new legislative mode enhancing the
powers of Parliament, called the co-decision process. 19 6 The co-decision process is even more complicated than parliamentary
cooperation.
The co-decision process has two essential features. First, if the
Council and Parliament are unable to agree upon the text of legislation when Parliament has proposed amendments to the Council draft,
then a Conciliation Committee representing the two bodies will intervene in an effort to achieve a compromise. The role of the Conciliation Committee would be not unlike the role of Conference
Committees of the Senate and the House of Representatives in the
United States. The Conciliation Committee would not be able to bind
either body, but could be expected to influence strongly the shape of
any legislation eventually adopted.
Second, if the Council and Parliament are unable to reach a compromise, then the Parliament could veto the legislation. The veto
power would not be absolute, however, because the Council could
vote a final time in favor of its text, which would be adopted unless
the Parliament voted against the Council proposal by an absolute ma195 For an able appraisal, see Deborah Z. Cass, The Word That Saves Maastricht? The
Principleof Subsidiarityand the Division of Powers Within the European Community, 29 CoMMON MKT. L. REV. 1107 (1992). The December 1992 Edinburgh Council issued guidelines for
the interpretation of the principle of subsidiarity. The text is not yet published in the E.C.
Bulletin, but is available from the Commission Information Service.
196 TEU, supra note 2, art. 189b. See generally BERMANN, GOEBEL, DAVEY & Fox, supra
note 11, at 89-90.
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jority-a negative vote which clearly would not always be easy to
attain.
The new co-decision process would be applied to a substantial
volume of legislation, most notably harmonization to achieve the internal market, 197 as well as the measures to achieve the free movement
of workers or the right of establishment, 19 and measures in the new
fields of action, namely, education, culture, public health, and consumer protection.1 99
The parliamentary cooperation process would not be totally supplanted by co-decision, but would continue for certain fields, such as
worker health and safety legislation,2 00 and will cover new areas, such
as most environmental protection measures, 201 and vocational
202
training.
The supranational character of the legislative process would be
further enhanced because the Council would be able to adopt a
greater volume of legislation by qualified majority vote, instead of
unanimity. Thus, the TEU would permit action by qualified majority
vote on most environmental protection measures, 20 3 and on measures
in the fields of education, public health, and consumer protection.
A peculiar variant would arise through the operation of the famous (or infamous) Social Protocol, annexed to the TEU. Because all
the other States wanted to permit qualified majority legislation in the
social policy, or employee rights field, while the United Kingdom
steadfastly opposed this, the Protocol would enable the other eleven
States to take social action measures binding themselves, but not the
UK, by a type of qualified majority vote calculated without the UK
weighted vote component. 204 This curious compromise would establish a two-tier Community in social legislation.
Thus, in sum, the legislative system of the Community as modified by the TEU would significantly enhance the federal, or supranational, character of the Community, both by enlarging the role of the
197 TEU, supra note 2, art. 100a.
198 Id. arts. 49 and 54.

199 Id. arts. 126, 128, 129 and 129a.
art. llSa.

200 Id.
201 Id.
202 Id.
203 Id.

art. 130s.
art. 127.
art. 130s.

204 The Protocol provides for action by a special weighted vote of 44. TEU, supra note 2.
An annexed Agreement on Social Policy describes the intended fields of action and mandates a
unanimous vote, instead of a qualified majority, for a few of the fields. TEU, supra note 2,
annexed Agreement on Social Policy, art. 2(3).
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Parliament, which represents a popular mandate independent of the
Member States, and by reducing the number of legislative actions
which require unanimous Council votes.
Turning next to the administrative and executive powers of the
Community, the TEU would make certain modifications in the direction of greater central authority, but the changes may turn out to be
more symbolic than real.
First, the Commission structure would be changed by the TEU.
The President of the Commission would be chosen by the Member
States initially, and then he or she would be consulted during the selection of the other Commissioners. 20 5 Further, there would be only
one or two Vice-presidents, instead of the present six, and they would
be designated by the Commission itself.2 "6
The apparent purpose of these changes is to enhance the role and
authority of the President and the Vice-president(s). The TEU takes
a small step in the direction of vesting the President of the Commission with a status similar to that of a Prime Minister, with the other
Commissioners acting more as cabinet members. It remains to be
seen whether the symbolism of the prior choice of the President will
translate into any additional customary authority.
Another significant change is that the Commission's term of office would be extended to five years,207 in order to be coterminous
with the mandate of the Parliament.20 8 Each newly designated Commission would be subject to a "vote of approval" by the Parliament
before taking office. 2 9 The apparent purpose of these changes is to
make the Commission-Parliament relationship begin to approximate
the relationship between a national prime minister and a national parliament. Again, it remains to be seen whether these largely symbolic
changes will produce any genuine political effect.
The TEU would not change the role of the Council, but it would,
for the first time, state the role of the European Council. Article D
states that the "European Council shall provide the Union with the
necessary impetus for its development and shall define the general
205 TEU, supra note 2, art. 158.

206 Id., art. 161.
207 Id. art. 158(1).
208 The five-year term system would begin on January 7, 1995, in order to parallel the term
of the Parliament elected in 1994. For this reason, the Commission designated to take office in
January 1993 will serve only a two-year term. EEC TREATY, supra note 1, as amended by

TEU, supra note 2, art. 158(3).
209 TEU, supra note 2, art. 158(2).
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political guidelines thereof. '210 While this merely describes what the
European Council has always done in practice, its statement as Treaty
language lends a legal character to the role of the European Council.
It is noteworthy that the European Council must take critically important decisions in the evolution of the EMU, and in the development of a common foreign and security policy, as a precondition for
Council action.211
Thus, in terms of administrative and executive powers, the TEU
has not made any drastic changes. The modifications made may over
time accentuate the executive power of the European Council, as well
as that of the Commission President, but it is certainly possible that
these changes will have only a minor symbolic effect.
Finally, as to judicial authority, the TEU made virtually no significant changes. The Maastricht Treaty does not, for example, create
any form of Community district courts, nor does it provide for appellate appeal from Member State supreme courts to the Court of
Justice.
The TEU does facilitate the work of the Court of Justice slightly
in several regards. First, it permits the Court to sit in chambers
rather than in plenary session to a greater degree.212 Second, it authorizes a broader Council delegation of types of proceedings to the
Court of First Instance.21 3 Finally, in proceedings under Article 171
against Member States which have failed to comply with judgments
rendered under Article 169, the Commission may request, and the
Court may award, penalties.214
In summary, the principal effect of the Maastricht Treaty on the
institutional structure of the Community would be to modify the legislative process in a manner which augments the powers of the Parliament and which increases qualified majority decision-making by the
Council. On the whole, the Maastricht Treaty would not increase
Id. art. D.
The European Council must decide when and how to move forward to the third stage of
the EMU. EEC TREATY, supra note 1,as amended by TEU, supra note 2, art. 109j(3) and (4).
The European Council must supply guidelines to the Council before the Council can take any
"joint action" in foreign or security policy. TEU, supra note 2, art. J.3(1).
212 The Court need only sit in plenary session when requested by a Member State or a
Commission institution that is party to the suit. EEC TREATY, supra note 1, as amended by
TEU, supra note 2, art. 165.
213 EEC TREATY, supra note 1, as amended by TEU, supra note 2, art. 168a. The only type
of proceedings that the Council cannot assign to the Court of First Instance will be the answers
to preliminary questions raised by national courts under Article 177.
214 EEC TREATY, supra note 1, as amended by TEU, supra note 2, art. 171(2).
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ing internal problems, little attention has been given to the drafting of
proposals for a federal structure.
Therefore, from a practical point of view, the principal interest
which central and eastern European states presently have in the European Community as a type of federal system lies in their desire, in the
medium or long term, in themselves becoming Member States, or at
least becoming closely linked to the Community.
During the period of consideration of the proposals that became
the Maastricht Treaty, the Community also had to confront the issues
involved in a possible expansion to include new Member States or,
alternatively, to develop closer relations with the other European
states, whether in the EFTA and in eastern Europe. This possible
expansion process is commonly designated the "widening" of the
Community, in distinction to the addition of new fields of action and
the augmentation of central authority produced by the Maastricht
Treaty, referred to as the "deepening" of the Community.
To what extent and in what manner the Community's relations
with central and eastern European states should be intensified is an
important issue within the overall examination of the widening of the
Community. The final part of this article will review the Community's current relations with central and eastern Europe and then consider how these relations might develop into either the accession of
certain states to the Community or into an alternative but still intimate relationship.
A. Present Community Relations with Eastern Europe
During the post-World War II period of Communist domination
of the Soviet Union and the eastern European states, trade relations
between the European Community and these states remained at a relatively low level. Until the 1980s, no preferential trade agreements
existed, except with Yugoslavia, after President Tito removed his
country from the Soviet Bloc. Many eastern European products were
subject to quotas and the Community frequently took protective trade
action in the form of anti-dumping and anti-subsidy proceedings
against eastern European states.
Although trade discussions did begin in 1977 between the Community and the Soviet bloc's Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon), grouping ten eastern European states in a trade
zone, the first significant breakthrough occurred on June 25, 1988,
when the Community and Comecon signed a Joint Declaration for
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dramatically the powers of the Community central governing bodies
at the expense of the Member States. Like the changes inaugurated
by the Single European Act, the modifications made by the Maastricht Treaty move the Community only gradually towards a more
federal or supranational union.
V.

THE WIDENING OF THE COMMUNITY: ITS RELATIONS WITH
EASTERN EUROPE

A year or two ago, there was some feeling that the European
Community's economic federalism, a looser structure than the more
centrally-oriented federal forms in the United States, Canada or Germany, might serve as a suitable model for certain eastern European
states in their transition from marxism to democratic liberalism.
Although federalism represented no particular interest to traditionally
unitarian states such as Hungary, Poland, and Romania, the loose
federalism of the European Community might have served as a model
for the Czech and Slovak Republic, Yugoslavia, or the new Commonwealth of Independent States. Unfortunately, this seems unlikely at
the present time.
The most likely candidate for a looser form of federalism appeared to be the Czech and Slovak Republic, where some political
leaders made great efforts to devise a federalist structure to keep the
two states together.2 15 The pressure for total autonomy for the Slovak
people proved too strong, however, and the Czech Republic and
Slovakia are now destined for separate sovereign status, with only limited preferential rights for the free movement of persons and the free
flow of trade and commerce between the two states.
The tragic breakdown of Yugoslavia, not only into separate component states, but states engaged in a bloody civil war, leaves little
room for hope of an eventual federal structure. Conceivably Croatia
and Slovenia may in the future enter into a federal relationship, but
this is highly speculative. As for the Commonwealth of Independent
States which presently groups most, but not all, of the former component parts of the Soviet Union, this presently appears likely to evolve
into a very loose structure. Given the preoccupation of the Russian
Republic, the Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and other states with their press215 Careful analyses of the federal constitutional structure initially devised for the Czech
and Slovak Republic are contained in Lloyd Cutler & Herman Schwartz, ConstitutionalReform in Czechoslovakia: EDuobus Unum?, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 511,516 (1991) and Eric Stein,
Devolution or Deconstruction Czecho-Slovak Style, 13 MIcH. J. INT'L L. 786 (1992).
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the promotion of trade relations.2 1 6 This Joint Declaration permitted
negotiations for agreements with specific countries, resulting in trade
agreements with Czechoslovakia and Hungary in 1988, with Poland
and the Soviet Union in 1989, and Bulgaria in 1990.217
As the Communist bloc disintegrated in 1989 and 1990, giving
way to new democratic regimes, these trade agreements took on increased importance. The agreements essentially require the Community to reduce or eliminate quotas on agricultural and commercial
products, and obligate both sides to take measures to liberalize and
promote trade. Agreements of a similar character have more recently
been signed between the European Community and Romania in
1991,218 and Albania, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania in 1992.219
Even more important than these trade agreements as a means of
providing support for the new democratic governments has been the
Community's program of economic aid and general assistance. Since
the first two central European states to throw off the marxist hegemony and to install democratic governments were Hungary and Poland, the Community aid program began with these countries in early
1989. This program was designated Phare, combining an acronym
for Poland and Hungary Assistance for Economic Restructuring with
a poetic reference, since "phare" means lighthouse in French.
The Group of Seven leading industrial powers (G-7) at its sum216 Joint Declaration, 1988 O.J. (L 157) 35.
217 The trade agreements with Czechoslovakia and Hungary are discussed in the XXIIND
GENERAL REPORT, supra note 100,
905-6, with Poland in COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITIES, XXIIIRD GENERAL REPORT OF THE ACTIVITIES OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 1989, at t 790 (1990) [hereinafter XXIIIRD GENERAL REPORT], and with Bulgaria
and the Soviet Union in the XXIVTH GENERAL REPORT, supra note 157, %%
675 and 684.

The trade agreement with Hungary, which has largely been the model for the later agreements,
is found in Council Decision 88/595, 1988 O.J. (L 327) 1. For reviews of the trade and economic assistance arrangements between the Community and eastern Europe during this period
of transition in 1988-90, see Dan Horovitz, EC-Central/EastEuropean Relations: New Principles for a New Era, 27 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 259 (1990); David Kennedy & David E. Webb,
Integration:Eastern Europe and the European Economic Communities, 28 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 633 (1990); Susan Senior Nello, Some Recent Developments in EC-East European
Economic Relations, 24 J. WORLD TRADE L. 5 (1990).
218 The Romanian trade agreement was signed in October 1990 but formally concluded in

March 1991. Council Decision 91/159, 1991 O.J. (L 79) 12. See the comments in XXVTH
GENERAL REPORT, supra note 57,
821 and 839.
219 COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, XXVITH GENERAL REPORT ON THE

ACTIVITIES OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 1992, 747 (1993) [hereinafter XXVITH GENERAL REPORT]. The agreement with Albania is in Council Decision 92/600, 1992 03. (L 343)
1; with Estonia in Council Decision 92/601, 1992 O.J. (L 403) 1; with Latvia in Council Decision 92/602, 1992 O.J. (L 403) 10; and with Lithuania in Council Decision 92/603, 1992 O.J.

(L 403) 19.
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mit meeting in Paris in July 1989 charged the Community with the
primary responsibility of arranging and coordinating aid to the
fledgling democracies of central Europe. The Phare program represented the Community's initial action in accord with this responsibility. In its first stage, the program provided financial aid and
economic, environmental, and technical assistance to Hungary and
Poland in order to help sustain their political and economic reforms.22° In May 1990, the Community expanded Phare to cover
Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic (prior to
its unification with West Germany in December 1990), Romania, and
Yugoslavia. 221 Phare was extended to the Baltic states in 1991.222
The Phare program has provided millions of dollars of financial
aid earmarked for specific projects, including emergency food aid,
modernization of infrastructure in transport and telecommunications,
pollution control and environmental protection, quantitative and
qualitative improvement of agricultural production, training of personnel in the banking and securities fields as well as aid to designated
privatization projects.223 Phare is widely considered to be a success,
but nonetheless only a partial one, because Community budgetary
constraints naturally limit the total amount of any financial aid
package.
Phare was soon supplemented by inter-university cooperation
and vocational training programs. The Community's highly successful Erasmus program to promote academic exchange and inter-institutional research among faculty and students of Community
universities 224 was expanded to include selected countries in central
Europe, beginning with Hungary and Poland. This Trans-European
Mobility Program for University Studies (Tempus) commenced in
1990.225

The inherent budgetary limits on financial aid led the European
220 Council Regulation 89/3906 on economic aid to Hungary and Poland, 1989 O.J. (L 375)
11. See also the description in XXIIIRD GENERAL REPORT, supra note 217, 1 786.
221 XXIVTH GENERAL REPORT, supra note 157, 11 668-70.
222 XXVTH GENERAL REPORT, supra note 57, 1 831.
223 785 million ECU was allocated to Phare in 1991, id. q 810, and

one billion ECU in 1992,

XXVITH GENERAL REPORT, supra note 219, lI 756-58. The Phare program is described in a
booklet, COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, PHARE-ASSISTANCE FOR ECONOMIC RESTRUCTURING IN THE COUNTRIES OF CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE (1992).

See also Kennedy & Webb, supra note 217, at 648-52.
224 See supra note 192.
225 The purpose of the Tempus program is set forth in E.C. Bull. 1990-1/2, at 71-72. The
Council authorized a European Training Foundation to carry out the Tempus program in
Council Regulation 90/1360, 1990 O.J. (L 131) 1. In 1992, the Tempus program consisted of
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Community, the United States, and other states to create a new mechanism for assistance to central and eastern Europe, namely the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). President
Mitterand of France made the initial proposal for such a bank in an
address to the European Parliament in October 1989. The European
Council meeting in Strassbourg in December 1989 endorsed the
idea,22 6 and planning moved forward with unusual rapidity. The
Agreement creating the EBRD was signed on May 29, 1990.227
The EBRD, although principally a Community initiative, is comprised of forty shareholder states, together with the European Community.22 8 The Community and its twelve Member States together
contributed fifty-one percent of the ten billion ECU capital of the
bank. The U.S. is also an important shareholder, contributing ten
percent, with other leading commercial states and the eastern European states themselves contributing the remainder. The EBRD's
headquarters is London. Its first President is Jacques Attali, formerly
a financial advisor to President Mitterand.
The EBRD began operations in' April 1991 and, by the end of
1992, it was providing substantial financial support for a variety of
projects in central and eastern Europe.2 2 9 Principally, the bank provides long-term loans, financial guarantees, and commercial performance bonds for infrastructure modernization, environmental
protection and pollution control projects, and efforts to privatize industrial and commercial operations. Moreover, the EBRD provides
technical assistance in the conception and structuring of such
projects, a vitally important role given the limited number of qualified
financial and commercial personnel in eastern European governments
and in the private sector.
In addition to the Phare program and the operations of the
EBRD, the Community has granted substantial amounts of medium
term financial assistance to specific central and eastern European
states. Thus, in 1991, the Community made loans of 375 million
ECU to Czechoslovakia, 290 million ECU to Bulgaria, 375 million
637 projects involving more than 10,000 teachers and 6,400 students. XXVITH GENERAL
REPORT, supra note 219,
426.
226 XXIVTH GENERAL REPORT, supra note 157,
54.
227 Id. The Council Decision on the Bank's Articles of Agreement is at Council Decision
90/674, 1990 O.J. (L 372) 1.
228 The legal structure and proposed operations of the EBRD are described in D.R.R. Dunnett, The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development: A Legal Survey, 28 COMMON
MKT. L. REv. 571 (1991).
229 XXVITH GENERAL REPORT, supra note 219,

44-47.

218

NEW EUROPELAW REVIEW

[Vol. 1:163

ECU to Romania, and 180 million ECU to Hungary.2 30 In 1992, the
Community continued its medium-term financial aid policy by granting a 1.25 billion ECU loan to Russia and other former Soviet states,
as well as 480 million ECU to Albania, Bulgaria, Romania, and the
Baltic states.2 31
B.

The Europe Agreements

In 1990-1991, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland and, to a lesser
degree, other central European states made rapid progress in the rebuilding of democratic institutions. Their progress in dismantling
their state-controlled economies and establishing economic liberalism
and privatization of industry and agriculture was more limited, but
still definite. The Commission and the leaders of the Member States,
acting through the European Council, determined that it was time to
move toward a more intimate relationship with the central European
states that had made the most progress.
For their part, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland all expressed a desire to achieve full membership in the European Community as soon as possible, and to attain the closest practicable economic
relations in the meantime. This aspiration is shared by some political
leaders in the Baltic states, Bulgaria, Romania, and Slovenia.
The Community accordingly decided to adapt its system of association agreements into a form suitable for a new stage in relations
with central and eastern Europe. Association agreements, provided
for in Article 238 of the EEC Treaty, are intended to facilitate preferential trade arrangements, mutual investment rights, technical and
developmental aid, and, in some cases, rights of free movement and
residence for migrant workers. The first association agreements were
with Greece in 1961 and Turkey in 1963, and both agreements foresaw the possibility that each state might eventually join the
Community.
During the 1960s and 1970s, the Community expanded its network of association agreements to include virtually all Mediterranean
states: Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Israel, Lebanon, Syria, Cyprus, and Malta.2 32 The agreements generally follow the above-indi230 XXVTH GENERAL REPORT, supra note 57, 74.
231 XXVITH GENERAL REPORT, supra note 219, %t 48-50 and ] 771-81.
232 For a general review of association agreements, see JACQUELINE D. MATTHEWS, AssoCIATION SYSTEM OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (1989); Williams Rawlinson, An Overview
of EEC Trade with Non-Community Countriesand the Law Governing Those External Agreements, 13 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 208 (1989-90).
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cated pattern, although with significant variation as to establishment
and investment rights and the rights of mobility for migrant workers.
Notably, none of these agreements foresee the eventual admission into
the Community of the state involved. Following the breakup of Yugoslavia, the Community denounced its 1983 association agreement.
Its benefits were effectively maintained for most of the new states of
the former Yugoslavia, but were suspended as to Serbia because of its
support for the Serbian rebels in Bosnia-Herzegovenia.233
After the Council of Foreign Ministers approved the use of association agreements for central and eastern Europe, the Commission
issued a General Outline 234 for such agreements, to be denominated
Europe Agreements to mark "the importance of the political initiative
which they represent.

' 23'

The Commission declared that states must,

in effect, qualify for a Europe Agreement by "giving practical evidence of their commitment to the rule of law, respect for human
rights, the establishment of multi-party systems, free and fair elections
and economic liberalisation with a view to introducing market
economies.

' 23 1

The General Outline indicates six objectives for Europe Agreements. The most interesting are the first two, which are essentially
political in nature. The Europe Agreements are intended to "help
create a climate of confidence and stability favouring political and
economic reform" 237 - in other words, the Commission intends the
agreements to reinforce the states' movement to democracy and freemarket economic liberalism. The Europe Agreements then foresee a
reward for the states involved. The second objective of the Agreements is to enable these states to participate in some appropriate manner in the benefits of the Community's single European market. The
General Outline does not expressly promise ultimate Community
membership, but does refer to the European Economic Area with the
EFTA countries as a possible model for relations with eastern European states.
233 Council Decision 91/602, O.J. (L 325) 23 denounced the Yugoslav association agree-

ment, while Council Regulation 91/3567, 1991 O.J. (L 342) 1 renewed the prior agreement's
trade concessions as to Bosnia-Herzegovenia, Croatia, Macedonia, and Slovenia, but not as to

Serbia.
234 XXIVTH GENERAL REPORT, supra note 157, 672. Extracts of the Commission's General Outline are reproduced in BERMANN, GOEBEL, DAVEY & Fox, supra note 11 at 943-45.

The full text appears in Agence Europe, Eur. Docts. No. 1646/47 (Sept. 7, 1990).
235 BERMANN, GOEBEL, DAVEY & Fox, supra note 11, at 943.
236 Id. at 943-44.
237 Id. at 944.
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The next three objectives cited in the General Outline are economic in character: arrangements to promote trade and investment on
a reciprocal basis; financial and technical assistance, including training of officials, management and technical personnel, in order to facilitate the states' transition to market-based economies; and,
arrangements for multiannual financial support to assist the states to
attain economic and monetary stability. The final objective is sociocultural: to promote educational, informational, and cultural exchanges, especially among young people, to encourage a "shared sense
2' 38
of European identity.
The Europe Agreements mark a new stage in Community-eastern European relations, advancing further than the "first generation"
of relatively elementary trade agreements. Not only do the Europe
Agreements share the general characteristics of association agreements noted above, but they have special features. Presumably, the
reason for these features is that many of the Member States, in particular France, Germany, and Italy, traditionally have had strong ties
with most of the central European states. These ties were forcibly
interrupted by the period of Communist domination, and are now being re-established. The reference to the "shared sense of European
identity" expresses the sense that the Community has a particular affinity with these states, as it also does with the EFTA states, more
intense than with non-European states.
Although the commercial and economic importance of the Europe Agreements should not be underestimated, their political significance is their most striking feature. It is of capital importance to the
Community that the principal central and eastern European states,
especially those immediately adjacent, should not retrograde to authoritarian political institutions, whether of a right or left-wing nature. The Community is also concerned with the risk that these states
will encounter such serious difficulties in the process of privatization
and transition to a free market that the result will be monetary chaos,
excessive inflation, massive unemployment, or other causes of social
unrest. The Europe Agreements provide assistance to prevent against
such real dangers. Moreover, the Agreements hold out the promise of
even closer integration into the Community's single internal market, a
promise intended to induce the states involved to accept the sacrifices
necessary to move to firm democratic structures and free-market
economies.
238

Id. at 945.

1993] COMMUNITY BRAND OFECONOMIC FEDERALISM 221
On December 16, 1991, Europe Agreements were signed simultaneously with Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland. 239 The Commission noted: "These agreements will enable those countries to take part
in the process of European integration and will help them to progress
toward their ultimate objective, which is to become full members of
the Community."'2 4 The European Parliament must give its assent to
any association agreement .241 Parliament acted favorably on the Europe Agreements with Hungary and Poland, but declined to act on
that with the Czech and Slovak Republic in view of its impending
dissolution.242 In any event, none of the Europe Agreements has been
finally ratified, so they are not yet in force.
Further Europe Agreements were signed in late 1992 with
Romania and Bulgaria.243 As these agreements have only now begun
to be reviewed by Parliament, ratification cannot be expected for some
time.
Because it was anticipated that the process of parliamentary review and ratification of the Europe Agreements would be lengthy, the
Community entered into Interim Trade Agreements in April 1992
with Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland.2' These replace the earlier "first-generation" trade agreements with these states. 245 Pursuant
to the Interim Trade Agreements, more than half of these states' exports to the Community now enter free of duty. 246 The principal exceptions are agricultural products, a sensitive political issue in view of
the large Community surpluses, the difficult negotiations in the Uruguay Round of GATT on such products, and the Community's con239 XXVTH GENERAL REPORT, supra note 57,

835, 837 and 842. Because these Europe

Agreements have not yet been ratified, their texts have not been officially published. The unofficial texts are available from the Commission Information Service. The annexes, however, are
not yet complete. See George Bustin, Michael Sussman, Lucyna Tokarczyk & Juraj Strasser,
EC Association Agreements: Time to Renegotiate, 10 INT'L FIN. L. REv. 26 (Oct. 1992) (providing a short summary of the Europe Agreements' provisions).
240 XXVTH GENERAL REPORT, supra note 57, 810. The Preamble of the Europe Agreements with Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland each referred to that state's objective of
Community membership.
241 SEA, supra note 6, amending EEC TREATY, supra note 1, art. 238.
242 XXVITH GENERAL REPORT, supra note 219, %746. Presumably separate new Europe
Agreements will have to be negotiated with the Czech Republic and with Slovakia.
243 Id.
244 Council Decision 92/228, 1992 O.J. (L 114) 1 (Republic of Poland); Council Decision
92/229, 1992 O.J. (L 115) 1 (Czech and Slovak Republic); Council Decision 92/230, 1992 O.J.
(L 116) 1 (Republic of Hungary).
245 Supra note 217.
246 XXVITH GENERAL REPORT, supra note 219, q 749.
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cern that opposition by farmers might jeopardize ratification of the
Maastricht Treaty.
Textiles, coal, and steel are other products where the Community
is reluctant to lower tariffs or remove quotas because of its own surplus production, as well as excess production on the world markets.
The Community's desire to control the level of imports of these products from eastern Europe is augmented by its concern for the severe
unemployment and social unrest in the former East Germany, which
is likewise a substantial producer of such products. Protocols and annexes will require the Community to reduce and ultimately eliminate
its tariffs and quotas on almost all textiles, coal, iron, and steel products over a six-year period.
Turning from trade issues to the important topic of the rights of
establishment and investment, the Europe Agreements are a dramatic
step toward the integration of eastern European states into the Community's single market. The Community is obligated to grant national treatment (i.e., an elimination of any discrimination based on
nationality) to the nationals and enterprises of the east European signatory states, which means that they will have easy access to the
Community. On the other hand, rights of establishment of Community nationals and enterprises in the eastern European states will be
phased in over five to ten years, a precaution intended to reduce the
risk that their economic sectors will be taken over by much stronger
Community entities. Ten year phase-in terms are specifically provided for the sectors of financial services and natural resources.
The Europe Agreements do not provide for free movement of
workers. The Community certainly did not want to open its borders
to migrant workers from eastern Europe, due to the Community's
own high unemployment rate and the fear that a flood of unemployed
workers from the east would exacerbate the problem. (In fact, there is
growing concern that thousands of East European workers have become illegal immigrants in the Community.) However, the Europe
Agreements do provide that Community Member States must not alter unfavorably the status of eastern European workers already legally
present in the Community.
Another important feature of the Europe Agreements is the requirement that the eastern European signatory states adopt legislation
embodying the essential elements of the Community rules on competition under EEC Treaty Articles 85 and 86. For the Community this
was imperative, because in the absence of such rules the marxist state
monopolies could be succeeded by monopolies, price-fixing cartels,
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and other restrictive practices in the private sector. The process of
adopting implementing legislation and creating regulatory authorities
has begun in Hungary and Poland, but the necessary education of
public and private sector economic operators, with regard to the obligations of competitive behavior, will be slow.
Looking toward the eventual possible admission of the east European signatory states into the Community, these states are required to
harmonize their legislation with the Community insofar as possible.
The importance of this obligation cannot be over-estimated. Due to
its active harmonization of laws program in the 1970s and 1980s, augmented by the recent wave of legislation intended to achieve the internal market by 1992, the Community has hundreds of major directives
that must be implemented into national legislation. Consequently, as
the signatory states replace their marxist rules with new free-market
legislation, in such fields as banking, company law, securities law, insurance, intellectual property, environmental protection, consumer
rights, employee relations, etc., they will be looking to the Community model.
C. Medium Term Prospects: The EEA as a Model
Viewing the future optimistically, at some point later in this decade, the Europe Agreements with Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and perhaps other states will have
been largely implemented to the satisfaction of all parties. 24 7 All of
the signatory states will have attained firmly-established democratic
regimes and have largely transformed their economies into free market systems, including the controls provided by a nascent competition
law.
Several, and perhaps most, of the central and eastern European
states that have implemented their Europe Agreements will be both
ready and desirous to move to greater integration with the European
Community. Although some of these states may prefer full membership, there is a strong likelihood that the Community will instead opt
247 Although this is pure speculation on the part of the author, it is possible that no further
Europe Agreements will be entered into, at least not for several years. It seems unlikely that
the protracted conflict in the former Yugoslavia will permit any of the new republics there to
enter into Europe Agreements. Albania's economic condition and its democratic credentials
are sufficiently doubtful to make it an unlikely candidate for a Europe Agreement. Relations
with Russia and the other states of the CIS are likely to be limited to trade agreements. Only
the Baltic states may perhaps aspire to Europe Agreements in the near term.
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to transform relations into a form similar to the proposed EEA. 248
Indeed, it may even turn out that certain eastern European states will
join in the European Economic Area together with those EEA states
that have not by that time become Community Member States. It is
therefore appropriate at this point to describe the contours of the
EEA as a possible model for the next stage of Community-eastern
European relations.
The European Economic Area is the latest stage in relations between the European Community and the countries bound together in
EFTA, namely Austria, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and Liechtenstein (linked to Switzerland by an economic and
customs union). The EFTA agreement, 24 9 sometimes called the
Stockholm Convention, was signed in 1960 in order to form a free
trade bloc that might serve as a counter-balance to the then young
European Economic Community. Although EFrA has neither aspired to, nor achieved the sort of supranational structure of the Community, EFTA did attain a substantial level of trade liberalization
among its members by the end of the 1970s, including the abolition of
all duties and quotas on industrial products.
In 1973, when Denmark and the United Kingdom left EFTA to
join the European Community, the Community entered into virtually
identical favorable trade agreements with all of the EFTA states, resulting in free trade in industrial products since 1984.250 Then, on
April 9, 1984, a joint ministerial conference of the Community and
EFTA states adopted the Luxembourg Declaration, calling for increased cooperation, annual ministerial meetings, and movement to' 25
ward the creation of "a dynamic European economic space. '
After the Community adopted the goal of achieving an integrated internal market by December 31, 1992,252 the EFTA countries
naturally desired to participate in some fashion in the benefits of such
a market. The concept of such participation, originally called the
248 Remember the express Commission reference to this possibility in the General Outline
policy statement discussed supra note 237 and accompanying text.
249 The current text of the EFTA Agreement is contained in EFTA SECRETARIAT, THE
EUROPEAN FREE TRADE ASSOCIATION 118 (3d ed. 1987). Denmark, Portugal, and the

United Kingdom originally joined EFTA in 1960, but later left to become Community Member States.
250 For a description of Community-EFTA relations before the EEA, see E.P.N. Gardener,
The European Free Trade Association and the European Community, 25 INT'L LAW. 187
(1991).
251 E.C. Bull. 1984/4, at 9-10.
252 SEA, supra note 6, art. 8a. See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
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"European Economic Space," was later termed the "European Economic Area." Negotiations between the Community and the EFTA
states were long and arduous, throughout all of 1990 and 1991, with
particularly sensitive issues arising as to the maritime industry, fishing
rights, environmental protection (including the well-publicized Swiss
opposition to further trans-alpine highways), application of competition rules, free movement of workers, and the institutional framework
of the new structure.253
The initial draft EEA Agreement was submitted by the Commission to the Court of Justice for prior review pursuant to Article 228 of
the EEC Treaty. 54 The Court's famous Opinion on the European
Economic Area,2 55 discussed in Part I above with regard to the
Court's description of the constitutional dimensions of the Community, required modifications of the EEA Agreement to eliminate a
proposed court structure in the EEA framework. Following the
Court's approval of this modification, 56 the EEA Agreement was
signed in Oporto, Portugal on May 2, 1992.257
On October 29, 1992, the European Parliament gave its assent,
required by EEC Treaty Article 238, to the EEA Agreement.25 8 The
EEA Agreement is presently in the process of ratification by all the
Community and EFTA states. The parties intended the new structure to commence on January 1, 1993, but this is no longer possible
because Switzerland, by a fifty-one percent majority adverse vote in a
referendum, rejected the EEA Agreement.2 59 Negotiations are cur253 XXIVTH GENERAL REPORT,

supra note 157, at

608; XXVTH

GENERAL REPORT,

supra note 57, 846-52.
254 The Council, Commission, or any Member State may request the Court to review the
compatibility with the EEC Treaty of a proposed international agreement and the Court's
opinion is then binding.
255 Opinion 1/91, supra note 43 and accompanying text. See Noreen Burrows, The Risks of
Widening Without Deepening, 17 EUR. L. REV. 352 (1992).
256 Opinion 1/92, 1992 E.C.R. - (not yet reported) (Apr. 10, 1992), 2 C.M.L.R. 217
(1992).
257 XXVITH GENERAL REPORT, supra note 219,
789, which also briefly summarizes the
EEA Agreement provisions. The text of the EEA Agreement has not yet been officially published, but is available from the Commission Information Service. The text with all its annexes
is voluminous. The Common Market Law Review has published the principal text and protocols in The EEA Treaty: Main Agreement and Selected Protocols, 29 COMMON MKT. L. REv.
1247 (1992). See also Commission proposal for a Council regulation to implement aspects of
the EEA Agreement, 1992 O.J. (C 339) 11.
258 XXVITH GENERAL REPORT, supra note 219,
789.
259 Id. The narrow Swiss majority against ratification came despite a vigorous campaign in
favor waged by the Government, business, and financial leaders. The principal opposition
came in German-speaking cantons, which appeared to be strongly influenced by fears of floods
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rently underway between the Community, Switzerland, and the other
EFTA states to determine how to modify the EEA Agreement to
have it go into effect without Switzerland. The principal difficulties lie
not only in determining the relation of Switzerland to the EEA structure, but also the increased amount of monetary contributions by the
other EFTA states to the cohesion fund to replace that scheduled for
Switzerland.2 60
The level of economic integration between the Community and
EFTA states that would be produced by the EEA Agreement, 261 represents a quantum leap forward from the present stage of trade relations among those states, as well as in comparison with the close
relations attained between the Community and the signatory eastern
European states under the Europe Agreements. Arguably, the EEA
Agreement comes close to making the EFTA states non-voting members of the Community. Indeed, the obligation imposed on the EFTA
states to align their legislation with the Community's would seem to
be an acceptable burden only in view of the fact that most of the
EFTA states (Austria, Finland, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland)
are applicants for Community membership.
Attaining a single integrated internal market means the elimination of barriers to the free movement of goods, workers, services, and
capital, with the concomitant right of establishment. With limited exceptions, the EEA Agreement obligates the Community and the
EFTA states to remove such barriers among themselves.262 Moreover, the internal market program of the Community comprises important legislation in the areas of consumer rights, environmental
of immigrants and the harm foreseen to Swiss grass-roots democracy. Alan Riding, Swiss
Reject Tie to Wider Europe, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 1992, at A7.
260 See infra note 267 and accompanying text.
261 Two excellent articles on the EEA Agreement have now appeared. See Sven Norberg,
The Agreement on a European Economic Area, 29 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1171 (1992); Armando Toledano Laredo, The EEA Agreement: An Overall View, 29 COMMON MYT. L. REV.
1199 (1992).
262 Limited barriers to the free movement of goods will continue for certain agricultural
products and for fisheries, in view of the sensitive nature of these for both the Community and
several EFTA states. Accepting the free movement of workers proved difficult for Switzerland, which insisted on a five-year period to phase in the application of the right. (Note that
popular opposition to the free movement of workers proved to be one of the principal factors
in the negative vote in the Swiss referendum.) The freedom of establishment, right to provide
services, and free movement of capital occasioned EEA Agreement provisions which essentially parallel those in the EEC Treaty. Thus, the notable recent Community achievements in
the harmonization of company law, securities, banking, and insurance law will generally be
extended to the EFTA states, as will the beneficial effects for free movement of the professionals attained through the principle of mutual recognition of their higher education diplomas.
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protection, and social policy (employee rights), which the EFTA
states are also generally obligated to adopt.26 3 Finally, the EFTA
states must adopt a system of competition rules, together with administrative and judicial enforcement of those rules, which essentially
parallels the Community competition law.26 4 It is accordingly not
surprising that the EEA Agreement annexes a list of a total of 1500
Community legal measures that EFTA states are obligated to introduce as legislation or regulations in their own legal systems.
The EEA Agreement thus represents a program for legislative
action by the EFTA states even more ambitious than that assumed by
the Community in 1987 when it committed itself to attaining a completed internal market by the end of 1992. This is because the Community had already in place a substantial body of harmonized
legislation in 1987 to serve as the starting point, while the EFTA
countries must in large measure begin the process (unless, like Austria, they have opted in recent years to adapt their legislation to conform with Community directives). As Sven Norberg, the Director for
Legal Affairs of the EFTA Secretariat, has well said, at the end of the
process there will essentially be "a common European legal
26
system. The institutional structure to be created by the EEA Agreement,
principally for the EFTA states,266 is not of direct concern in the present review. It is worth noting, however, that the EFTA states are to
contribute substantial amounts to a Community cohesion fund, which
is intended to help lesser-developed regions of the Community to confront the challenge posed by the greater competitive pressures of a
completed internal market.2 67 Because the EFTA states are, generally
speaking, well-advanced industrial and commercial economies, these
contributions were required to balance the benefits they would receive
through the integration of their economies into the Community market. Unfortunately, Switzerland's rejection of the EEA Agreement
means that it will not contribute to the cohesion fund. The shortfall is
263 The EFTA states will however be allowed to adopt higher levels of protection in the

environmental field than are mandated by Community legislation. This is not surprising, given
the Scandinavian countries' traditional concern for the environment.
264 The complex system of administrative and judicial review, especially for competition law
matters which principally concern the EFTA states, as modified after the Court of Justice's
initial opinion, supra note 251, is described in Norberg, supra note 261, at 1187-94.
265 Norberg, supra note 261, at 1172.
266 See Toledano Laredo, supra note 261, at 1208-13.
267 XXVITH GENERAL REPORT, supra note 219, q 789.
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substantial and it is unclear to what extent, if at all, the other EFTA
states will be required to increase their contributions.
The European Economic Area, although a much higher stage of
integration than mere trade agreements, or even the Europe Agreements, is itself seen by most EFTA states as a stepping-stone to full
Community membership. If this should occur, only one or two
EFTA states may remain in the EEA by the end of this decade. In
that event, some of the eastern European states that have satisfactorily implemented their Europe Agreements may perhaps join with the
surviving EFTA states in a reconstituted European Economic Area.
Indeed, by the late 1990s, the central and eastern European
states may fall into four categories: those that remain at the level of
the present trade agreements, those that are signatories of Europe
Agreements, those that join in the EEA or some structural equivalent,
and those that seek full membership in the Community. The next
section reviews the process of application for membership and the
possible consequences for applicant states and for the Community.
D Possible Accession of New Member States
Article 237 of the EEC Treaty governs the admission, or, as it is
more commonly called, the accession of new states to the Community.268 The procedure set out in Article 237 requires the Commission
to give an initial opinion on the candidate state's suitability for membership, as well as the political, economic, and social issues involved
in its becoming a member. If the Commission's opinion is favorable,
the Community then negotiates with the applicant the terms of admission. These terms are incorporated into a treaty of accession, which
must be unanimously approved by the Council. Since the Single European Act's entry into force, the European Parliament must likewise
give its assent to any applicant. Finally, because every accession necessitates amendments to the Community treaty structure, all the
Member States and the applicant must ratify the treaty of accession.
At the time of the admission of Denmark, Ireland, and the
United Kingdom in 1973, the principle of the "acquis communautaire" was firmly established.26 9 This principle requires any
268 Admission to the Coal and Steel Community is governed by the ESCS TREATY, supra
note 1, art. 98, and to Euratom by the EURATOM TREATY, supra note 1, art. 205. The procedures set forth in each article are parallel to those under EEC Treaty Art. 237, except that the
SEA, supra note 6, did not amend these provisions to require the assent of Parliament, even
though it did so in EEC Treaty art. 237. EEC TREATY, supra note 1, art. 237.
269 The December 1-2, 1969 Hague summit meeting of the heads of state of the original six
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applicant to accept all aspects of the Community institutional structure, legislation, and Court of Justice doctrines as they exist at the
time of admission. Any modifications, in particular, provisions for
the phasing in of Treaty rights and obligations or legislation as applied to the applicant, must be expressly set forth in the treaty of
accession. 270
This approach has two consequences. First, the period of review
and negotiations has become increasingly lengthy as the Community
has grown in complexity. Thus, the negotiations for the treaty of accession for Greece took three years, and those for Portugal and Spain
each took over six years. Second, the treaties of accession are extremely long and detailed, and they invariably fix long periods of transition to phase in the application to the new Member States of various
Treaty rights, obligations, or Community rules in particular sectors. 27 ' These transitional periods in the Greek, Portuguese, and
Spanish treaties were set for as long as five to ten years for such sensitive areas as the free movement of workers or of capital, the entry into
force of all aspects of the CAP, and the grant of free fishing rights in
each other's territorial waters.2 72
Because the Community is now completing its internal market
integration, Community rules have grown substantially more voluminous and complex since Portugal and Spain entered. Applicant states
are faced with an even greater task of aligning their internal legislation to the rules of the Community. However, the EFTA states that
ratify the European Economic Area Agreement and commence applying its provisions, which already obligate them to modify their internal laws to adopt most of the present Community rules, will obviously
find it both easier to negotiate treaties of accession and easier to comMember States authorized the start of negotiations for accession with Denmark, Ireland, and
the United Kingdom, but stipulated that the applicants must accept the principle of the "acquis comrnunautaire."
270 See Case 203/86, Spain v. Council, 1988 E.C.R. 4563, in which the Court of Justice held
that Spain could not claim any exception to the rules laid down in the CAP unless they were
expressly granted in the Spanish accession treaty, and that Spain's expectation that certain
rules favorable to its dairy interests would be maintained did not prevent the Council from
taking legislative action to modify those rules.
271 Greece applied on June 15, 1975. Negotiations lasted from July 1976 to April 1979, and
Greece joined the Community on January 1, 1981. Portugal applied on March 28, 1977 and
negotiations occurred from October 1978 to March 1985, while Spain applied July 28, 1977
and negotiations took from February 1979 to March 1985. Portugal and Spain entered the
Community together on January 1, 1986.
272 E.C. Bull. 1979/5, at 9-16 summarizes the essential terms of the Greek treaty of accession, while E.C. Bull. 1985/3, at 7-9 does so for the Portuguese and Spanish treaties.
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ply with the requirements set in any transitional periods. To a lesser
extent, central and eastern European states may find eventual Community accession facilitated, because the Europe Agreements motivate them to follow, insofar as possible, the Community rules in many
sectors.
By the end of 1992, eight states had applied for admission to the
Community: Austria, Finland, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland
from among the EFTA states, and Cyprus, Malta, and Turkey. In
accordance with its duty to review applicants under EEC Treaty, the
Commission has provided favorable opinions with regard to Austria,27 3 Finland,2 74 and Sweden.27 5 The Commission has not yet provided an opinion concerning Norway's application, submitted only on
November 25, 1992,276 but this is likely to be also favorable.277 In
view of the Swiss referendum's rejection of the EEA Agreement, Switzerland cannot at present be seriously considered a candidate for admission to the Community. For various reasons, Cyprus, Malta, and
Turkey are unlikely to be serious candidates, at least in the near
term.

278

Although the applications of several states have been pending for
some time, the Community has preferred to begin negotiations with
new candidates only after the fate of the Maastricht Treaty has been
determined. In popular parlance, the Community view has been that
E.C. Bull. 1991/7-8, at 80-81; XXVTH GENERAL REPORT, supra note 57, 848.
E.C. Bull. 1992/11, at 1.4.1; XXYITH GENERAL REPORT, supra note 219, 742.
E.C. Bull. 1992/7-8, at 74; XXVITH GENERAL REPORT, supra note 219, ] 742.
E.C. Bull. 1992/11, at 1.4.3; XXVITm GENERAL REPORT, supra note 219, 3 797. Norway's decision to apply came after months of bitter internal debate, with the farming and
fishing interests tending to be opposed. See Norway FacingStormy Debate Over Membership in
the Community, EUROWATCH (Buraff. Pub.), Feb. 24, 1992, at 6-7.
277 It is highly unlikely that the Commission would issue an unfavorable opinion concerning
an EFrA state that has ratified the EEA Agreement. It is interesting, however, to note that
Norway itself might ultimately decide against Community membership, especially if a referendum on the subject is held. Norway had initially applied in 1970 and had been accepted along
with Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom, but a narrowly-adverse vote in a referendum in 1972 prevented Norway from joining the Community. It would be ironic if history
should repeat itself, but the Norwegian people today are still sharply divided on whether or not
to join.
278 The Commission has not as yet issued opinions on Cyprus and Malta, and those negotiations continue. XXVITH GENERAL REPORT, supra note 219, t 34-37. However, the political
partition of Cyprus between Greek and Turkish governments, and Malta's small economy and
population make favorable Commission opinions unlikely. In response to Turkey's 1987 application, the Commission, in 1989, concluded that Turkey could not presently fulfill Member
State obligations. XXIIIRD GENERAL REPORT, supra note 217, %801. See also Paul Lansing
and Paul Bye, New Membership and the Future of the European Community, 15 J. WORLD
COMPETITION L. REv. 59, 69-72 (1992).
273
274
275
276
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"deepening" of the Community should precede its "widening." The
Maastricht European Council of December 1991 did however ask the
Commission to study the implications of the accession of new states.
The Commission's report, Europe and the Challenge of Enlargement, 279 was submitted to the June 1992 Lisbon European Council.
This Commission report considers not only the states that had formally applied, but also states that could be reasonably expected to
apply, including, conceivably, central or eastern European states. The
Commission report emphasizes two prerequisites for admission: the
applicant states' adherence to democratic principles of government as
articulated by the European Council in its Copenhagen Declaration of
Democracy, 280 and their willingness and ability to accept the "acquis
communautaire.' '281 The report makes clear that an applicant state
must also possess "a functioning and competitive market economy
and an adequate legal and administrative framework. 2 z8 2 Eastern European states probably have some way to go before they satisfy this
latter condition.
The December 1992 Edinburgh European Council favored the
opening of negotiations with Austria, Finland, and Sweden early in
1993, and with Norway as soon as the Commission provided its report.283 Informal contacts are expected to begin even before Denmark
and the United Kingdom ratify the Maastricht Treaty in the late
spring, with formal negotiations starting after their ratification. The
fate of such negotiations is uncertain, if, contrary to expectation,
either Denmark or the United Kingdom should not ratify the Maastricht Treaty.
Looking at the future with an optimistic point of view, negotiations with Austria, Finland, Norway, and Sweden could go swiftly,
because they are all solidly democratic and advanced economic societies, and they are all prospective members of the European Economic
Area. Negotiations might even be concluded in 1994, with membership coming as soon as 1995 or 1996.
Some difficult issues must be confronted. The institutional structure of the Community will have to be significantly modified to accommodate four new states. It will have to be decided how many
votes each would have in the Council and how many members in Par279

E.C. Bull. 1992/3 Supp.; see also XXVITH

280 Supra note 134.
281 XXVITH GENERAL REPORT,
282 Id.
283 Id. 743.

GENERAL REPORT,

supra note 219, t 739.

supra note 219,

739.
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liament. More importantly, the functional efficiency of enlarged institutional bodies will have to be considered. The Court of Justice could
probably operate quite well with four more judges and another Advocate General or two-indeed, more personnel might lighten its load.
The Parliament could arguably handle an additional one hundred or
so members and function efficiently, given its use of committees.
The structure of the Commission is much more problematic.
How large can it become and still operate efficiently as a collective
body? To many observers, the Commission should remain a relatively
small body. The Maastricht European Council left the issue of the
future number of Commissioners open, and a Declaration annexed to
the TEU calls for a review of the question at a later date.28 4 If new
states are to be admitted, the five larger states may have to give up
their second Commissioner, and some system of rotation of Commissioners among smaller states may have to be adopted.
As for the Council, the difficult issue will be not only the number
of weighted votes to be given to the four applicants, but also the mode
of calculation of the qualified majority in voting. Will the Member
States, especially the larger ones, be willing to accept the adoption of
measures even when four, five or more states are in the minority?
This is seemingly the only efficacious solution, but its adoption poses
obvious political and psychological issues.
Another issue is the number of official languages. Should it be
increased, to include Finnish, Norwegian, and Swedish? Can the
Member States at long last agree to limit the number of working languages used in preparing draft proposals, reports, and secondary
materials, or in conducting meetings and conferences? If so, should
the working languages be limited to English and French or should
they include German, Italian, or Spanish? Cultural pride will make
this an issue difficult to resolve.
Once the Maastricht Treaty is ratified, yet another major issue
will arise. The Maastrict Treaty provides that EEC Article 237 will
be repealed and replaced by TEU Article 0. Article 0 sets forth the
same procedural steps in the process of application as does Article
237, but the end result is changed. The applicant state is admitted to
the European Union, which includes the European Community and
the EMU, the common foreign and security policy, cooperation in
justice and home affairs, and the concept of European citizenship.
284 TEU, supra note 2, Declaration on the Number of Members of the Commission and of
the European Parliament.
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Will the applicants, especially the Scandinavians, be willing to join
not only the Community, but also the broader structure of the Union?
This issue becomes all the more acute in view of the concessions
made to Denmark by the European Council on December 11-12, 1992
in Edinburgh. Denmark would be allowed to remain outside of aspects of the EMU, notably the third stage of the EMU and the single
European currency, and need not participate in aspects of the common foreign policy, notably common defense measures.285 If, as is
hoped, these concessions induce the Danes to ratify the Maastricht
Treaty, then Denmark will join the United Kingdom in remaining
outside of the EMU's most important aspects and will have its own
rights to opt out of significant developments in the common foreign
policy.
Finland and Sweden, traditionally neutralists in foreign policy,
may seek similar concessions. All three Scandinavian states may be
reluctant to participate in the second or third stages of the EMU.
However, most Member States are bound to resist such concessions to
the applicant states. After all, the more states remaining outside of
certain Union fields of action, the less successful such action is apt to
be. It is impossible to predict how this issue might be resolved.
In view of all the difficulties involved in the admission of Austria,
Finland, Norway, and Sweden, the admission of eastern and central
European states to the European Union and the European Community becomes speculative. Nonetheless, such speculation is obviously
of great interest.
Let us hypothesize that in five years conditions in several central
and eastern European states have evolved quite favorably. The Czech
Republic, Hungary, Poland, and perhaps other states have developed
stable democratic regimes and functional free-market economies.
They have also satisfactorily implemented the provisions of the European Agreements, including the development of a serious set of competition rules, the imitation of the Community's regulation of
commercial and financial transactions, and the creation of intellectual
property rights identical to those in the Community.
The European Community, or the European Union, as it then
may be called, may perhaps respond favorably by opening negotiations with the most advanced eastern states by the end of this century.
285 XXVITH GENERAL REPORT, supra note 219, 11. The full text of the European Council's declaration concerning Denmark is expected to be published in E.C. Bull. 1992/12 and is
presently available from the Commission Information Service.
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However, such negotiations are bound to be difficult, raising serious
political and structural issues for both the Community and the applicant east European states. Each successive enlargement by several
new states exacerbates the institutional efficiency problems discussed
above. While one can certainly envision a Community of twenty or
more states by the start of the next century, it is difficult to imagine
precisely what structure it might have.
One may speculate that the more states composing the European
Community, the greater the prospects for a looser federal structure,
rather than one dominated by central authorities. This is even more
apt to occur because the Scandinavian and eastern European states
represent political, social, and cultural traditions less homogeneous
than those of the original continental members of the Community.
A scenario in which the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and
perhaps other eastern European states join the Community by the end
of this decade is an optimistic one. It is equally possible that high
inflation rates, monetary instability, governmental deficits, high unemployment, or other economic or social problems may so hobble
even the most advanced eastern states that they will be unable to present a serious case for Community membership even in a medium-term
future.
In that event, the European Community will be presented with a
different but equally serious challenge. The Community must continue to provide economic support through the EBRD and the Phare
program, and beneficial trade concessions and technical assistance
through the Europe Agreements, for at least the rest of this decade.
In addition, the Community must evolve a suitable form of more intimate political relations with eastern Europe.
The Commission in its report, Europe and the Challenge of Enlargement, suggested the possibility that certain eastern European
states should be granted a form of associate status in various projects
of the Community. 286 The Commission returned to this concept in
another report, this time to the Edinburgh European Council.287
The report recommends that the various opportunities for political contact under the Europe Agreements should be intensively exploited. It suggests that the Community should go further in
286 Supra note 279.

287 Towards a Closer Association with the Countries of Central and Eastern Europe,
SEC(92)2301 final. The report is dated December 2, 1992 and is available from the Commission Information Service.

1993] COMMUNITY BRAND OF ECONOMIC FEDERALISM 235
developing a "structured institutional relationship with partner countries" in eastern Europe in sectors such as energy, the environment,
transport, telecommunications, science, and research.28 8 It even recommends that sessions of the Council dealing with such matters
should be attended by ministerial representatives of partner states,
with a voice but no vote.2 89 Such an approach could alleviate the
concern of eastern Europeans that their unfortunate past and their
present economic problems relegate them permanently to a sort of
second-class European status, on the outside of the Community looking in.
To end this section on a optimistic note, one can certainly hope
that several eastern European states, and particularly the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland, will enjoy the political leadership, the
economic capacity, and the good fortune to progress to a level that
would merit their acceptance as members of the European Community, before the end of this decade. As Members, they, along with the
Scandinavian states, could provide their own unique contributions to
the federal or supranational structure that is now called the European
Community but may soon be appropriately termed the European
Union.
The Commission in its report to the Edinburgh Council referred
to the aspiration of eastern European states to become members of the
Community and urged the European Council to accept this as a goal,
without modifying the conditions for accession. 290 The Commission
prudently noted that no timetable could be set and that periods of
transition would be required.2 9 1 Without making a commitment to
the goal of eastern European state membership, the Edinburgh European Council did call on the Council to consider the issues raised by
the Commission and placed the topic on the agenda for the spring
292
European Council meeting.
Thus, although not even the near term future of the Community
and eastern Europe is foreseeable, serious grounds for hope exist that
288 Id. at 8.
289 Id.

290 Id. at 2-3.
291 Id. at 3.

292 Conclusions of the Presidency, European Council in Edinburgh, 11-12 December 1992,
Part D, External Relations, points 7-9. The conclusions have not yet been published in the EC
Bulletin. The spring Council meeting will be held in Copenhagen under the Danish
presidency.
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the end of this decade will witness a new enlargement of the Community and the addition of a number of eastern European states.
CONCLUSION

This article has attempted to fulfill a double purpose. First, it
has tried to present in relatively clear fashion the fundamental federal,
or supranational, characteristics of the Community, initially as seen
through the Court of Justice's constitutional doctrines, and then
through a careful outline of the Community's present scope and institutional structure. The article then has attempted to show the degree
to which the Maastricht Treaty is intended to reinforce those federal,
or supranational, characteristics.
In this presentation, the intent has been to show that the Community does indeed represent a novel and a successful new form of
federalism, an "integrative federalism" to use Professor Lenaert's apt
phrase. The Community's success lies in its constantly increasing
transfer of sovereignty (principally in the economic sector, but also in
political and social fields) to a relatively efficient although certainly
unusual central structure. Although this transfer of sovereignty is
now well advanced, due to the success of the Single European Act and
the 1992 internal market program, nonetheless the Member States
have retained their national identities and been able to prosper in their
collaborative efforts.
The impact of the Maastricht Treaty remains to be seen. Many
of its provisions, especially those providing for an economic and monetary union, now appear rather visionary. Still, once ratified, implementation of its provisions in the medium-term future may well bring
added force to the federalist character of the Community, without
unduly sacrificing national identity. If the Maastricht Treaty does
succeed in developing a sense of European citizenship, it will have
achieved a great deal.
The second purpose of this article was to relate this "deepening"
of the Community to its "widening." The most immediate form of
"widening" is the creation of the European Economic Area, with the
prospect in the medium-term that several EFTA states will then move
on to full Community membership.
But "widening" will also include the Community's growing process of integration with east and central European states, the principal
concern of the current Symposium. The article has accordingly tried
to describe the evolution in relations between the Community and

1993] COMMUNITY BRAND OF ECONOMIC FEDERALISM 237
eastern Europe, moving from trade and aid relations to the new plateau of the Europe Agreements. The ultimate prospect of full membership for some eastern states must presently be assessed as
visionary, but a vision not without the realm of practical attainment.
It would seem appropriate to close by quoting Sir Leon Brittan,
the Commissioner currently charged with external relations:
Is the Community merely paying lip-service to the need to help our
Eastern neighbours, or is the commitment real? I am sure that the
commitment is a genuine one. The prospect of fully returning the
countries of Eastern and Central Europe to the family of European
nations has captured the imagination of millions of ordinary citizens in the Community, particularly the young. A real commitment to bring this about is bound to involve making difficult
choices. It is my firm view that the Community must find ways of
meeting this challenge.2 93
293 Commission Press Rel. IP(93)35 (Jan. 21, 1993), cited in 1 [New Development] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 96713 (1993).

